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Feminist legal theorists have devoted enormous attention to conceptualizing the 
issues of sex work and trafficking for sexual purposes. While these theories vary, 
they typically fall into one of two camps. The abolitionist perspective, having 
grown out of dominance feminist theory, perceives sex work as inherently 
exploitative. In contrast, a second group of theorists adopts a liberal notion of 
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individual choice and draws on the poststructuralist rejection of gender 
essentialism to envision a theoretical model of sex-worker rights. The legal and 
public policies that grow from these two models are similarly polarized. Radical 
feminist abolitionists are often strange bedfellows with evangelical Christian 
organizations, working to end all sex work by rescuing women, regardless of any 
individual volition exercised in choosing the profession. On the other hand, 
organizations focused on sex-worker rights seek to help sex workers take care of 
themselves without fully questioning the social circumstances that lead women to 
make such a choice. 
This Article proposes a new theoretical model of trafficking for sexual purposes: 
a third-way feminist account of sex trafficking. Leveraging the feminist literature 
on constrained autonomy, the author draws on her own experience working with 
trafficked African and Asian populations to offer this new approach. This model 
relies on the dominance feminist critique of social conditions generative of 
women’s economic desperation, which often underlies women’s choice to engage in 
sexual labor. At the same time, the author rejects gender essentialism and endorses 
a liberal notion of the individual woman as an actor with real, though constrained, 
personal autonomy. Having explored this theoretical model, the Article identifies a 
series of interventions in trafficking for sexual purposes that recognize the 
individual and her personal resources while ultimately seeking to further her own 
autonomy. 
In proposing these interventions, this Article directly offers a vision of how 
feminist legal theory can work to alleviate poverty and other social barriers that 
third-world women encounter in trying to support themselves and their families. 
Finally, the Article closes with a consideration of the relationship between the 
author’s proposed third-way feminist model and the international development 
literature on the capabilities approach. The interventions that arise from this third-
way conception of feminist theory complement the capabilities model of 
development, as both seek to broaden the individual’s life options in pursuit of a 
more robust individual agency. 
INTRODUCTION 
In May 2003, law enforcement officers raided a brothel in Chiang Mai, the 
capital of the northern region of Thailand and the regional center for the many 
indigenous peoples or hill tribes that populate the surrounding mountains.1 They 
conducted this raid at the behest of a coalition of Thai non-governmental 
organizations and an American evangelical Christian organization.2 The American 
organization, with funding from the U.S. government and in conjunction with the 
Thai non-governmental organizations, was dedicated to investigating and reporting 
brothels with children inside to the authorities, and tried to persuade the police to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. This raid is well documented in the popular press, even in the United States. See, 
e.g., Noy Thrupkaew, The Crusade Against Sex Trafficking: Do Brothel Raids Help or Hurt 
the ‘Rescued’?, NATION, Oct. 5, 2009, at 12, 15–16.  
 2. The International Justice Mission (IJM) is an evangelical human rights organization 
that works extensively on trafficking issues in the sex industry. IJM’s involvement in this 
raid is known and documented. See id. at 14.  
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shut down such locales.3 The particular brothel raided in this story was a brothel 
like many others in the country, filled with ethnically Shan women from Burma.4 
Most of the women were of the age of majority, but while accounts vary, some 
organizations asserted that there were teenagers working in the brothel as well.5 
How these teenagers reached the brothel is unclear; the organizations claiming that 
teenage girls were there also asserted that the girls’ presence could not be voluntary 
due to their age and that the girls were victims of human trafficking.6  
The coalition of organizations effected what they termed a “rescue” of the 
women in the brothel because of the believed presence of children.7 What followed 
was a human rights debacle. Twenty-eight women and girls, most of whom were, 
by all accounts, adults, were involuntarily detained beyond the period of time that 
victims of trafficking may be confined under Thai law. They were not arrested or 
charged with crimes, but detained, according to the authorities, because they had 
been rescued from a situation of human trafficking. They were deprived of access 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. Gary A. Haugen, the founder of IJM, has published a book that explains the 
philosophy and theology behind the work of IJM. GARY A. HAUGEN, GOOD NEWS ABOUT 
INJUSTICE: A WITNESS OF COURAGE IN A HURTING WORLD (1999).  
 4. See Thrupkaew, supra note 1, at 14.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. International law defines trafficking as 
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of 
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a 
person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of 
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery 
or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Trafficking 
Protocol].  
 7. While this raid has been discussed in the popular press, the account contained in the 
next five paragraphs summarizes my own conversations during the summer of 2003, which I 
spent traveling throughout Thailand as an interested movement participant. As I was in 
Thailand as a fellow social services worker who had provided assistance to trafficked 
women in Italy, my methodology was an informal snowball sampling approach: I 
interviewed trafficked women, former sex workers, and myriad social services providers, all 
with the goal of developing a broader understanding of the trafficking phenomenon on the 
ground in Thailand. While it is of course the case that cultural and linguistic gaps imposed 
significant limitations on my research, and I do not believe that my position as an outsider 
gave me an objective vantage point, I also believe that I, as a Westerner, had access to 
locations, individuals, and conversations that a Thai researcher could not have gained. In this 
regard, I wholeheartedly agree with Martha Nussbaum’s assessment of her own work in 
India: “In a situation of entrenched inequality, being a neighbor can be an epistemological 
problem.” MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 10 (2000). Simply 
stated, being an outsider gave me entrée to situations that neighbors could not have gained. I 
remain profoundly grateful for the way that the trafficked women, former sex workers, and 
social services providers shared their stories with me.  
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to their belongings and saved earnings, which were locked inside the inaccessible 
brothel under police control; they never regained ownership of these possessions. 
After a lengthy period of time, the government deported many of these women to 
Burma. All of these actions, which the women experienced as both harmful and 
alienating, occurred under the guise of rescuing them from the brothel in which 
they worked.  
According to social services workers who interviewed four women who escaped 
from the brothel as the police arrived, all of the women were ethnic Shan from 
Burma and were at least nineteen years of age at the time of the raid.8 Prior to 
immigrating to Thailand, their status as members of the Burmese Shan indigenous 
group rendered these women subject to summary detention and rape at any time at 
the hands of officers of the Burmese junta.9 Faced with the option of abuse by the 
authorities in a region of Burma overwhelmed by poverty, many Shan women 
chose, and continue to choose, to cross the mountains that demarcate the Thai-
Burma border and move to a Thai city to work in a brothel.10 This choice has a 
certain logic, as forced labor, forced relocations, and food shortages remain an 
endemic problem in Burma.11 For many, work in a Thai brothel presented the 
opportunity to escape the repression of the Burmese junta and to send adequate 
money home in order to support families, educate children, and maintain 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. The relationship of the Burmese government, which is comprised primarily of ethnic 
Burmans, and the Shan ethnic group is a complex one that is not truly monolithic; the details 
of this relationship are unimportant to the topic at hand. In short, the Shan are an ethnic 
minority that the junta targets for particularized forms of oppression. See, e.g., HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, NO SAFETY IN BURMA, NO SANCTUARY IN THAILAND pt. 4 (1997), available 
at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1997/07/01/no-safety-burma-no-sanctuary- thailand; 
MARTIN SMITH, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INT’L, BURMA (MYANMAR): THE TIME FOR 
CHANGE 19–20 (2002), available at http://www.minorityrights.org/1022/reports/burma-
myanmar-time-for-change.html; Burma “Terrorising Ethnic Minorities,” BBC NEWS 
WORLD EDITION (July 17, 2002, 06:49 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/2132986.stm.  
 9. THE SHAN HUMAN RIGHTS FOUND. (SHRF) & THE SHAN WOMEN’S ACTION 
NETWORK (SWAN), LICENSE TO RAPE: THE BURMESE MILITARY REGIME’S USE OF SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE IN THE ONGOING WAR IN SHAN STATE (2002), available at 
http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/reports/License_to_rape.pdf (documenting the use of 
rape as a weapon of war in Shan State); see also THE KAREN WOMEN’S ORG., STATE OF 
TERROR: THE ONGOING RAPE, MURDER, TORTURE AND FORCED LABOUR SUFFERED BY 
WOMEN LIVING UNDER THE BURMESE MILITARY REGIME IN KAREN STATE (2007), available 
at http://www.womenofburma.org/Statement&Release/state_of_terror_report.pdf 
(documenting sexual violence against women in Karen State, the home of another 
indigenous population in Burma).  
 10. SMITH, supra note 8, at 20 (“As a result [of ethnic tensions and conflict], despite the 
spread of ceasefires, by the turn of the century the humanitarian crisis was extreme in several 
border areas. In addition to illicit drug production, there were large numbers of internally 
displaced persons, as well as thousands of women going into prostitution in Thailand.”). 
 11. The Burmese military has made a policy of denying food supplies to ethnic regions 
and of forcing relocations and labor within these areas. Civilians are commonly compelled to 
serve as military porters or to sweep routes for mines in advance of troops. THE KAREN 
WOMEN’S ORG., supra note 9, at 9, 12.  
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households. From the perspective of these women, that they at times paid people to 
facilitate their passage to Thailand was merely incidental.  
Further, the women who escaped the brothel prior to the raid claimed that they, 
like the women “rescued” in this particular scenario, and like many other Shan sex 
workers in Thailand, worked in the brothel of their own volition. According to 
these women, they were free to come and go as they liked; they were not subject to 
physical restraint in any way. They were not in debt bondage in the traditional 
sense of the phrase, although some did at times take pay advances from the brothel 
manager to travel home and back; they would repay such advances with a portion 
of their earnings over time, much like a loan against future paychecks that some 
workplaces offer in the United States. Yet from the perspective of the American 
evangelical organization doing this work, the women in the brothel, particularly the 
minors, needed to be rescued from the brothel. According to the IJM employee 
with whom I spoke during the summer following the raid, as all of the women had 
traveled across borders and left their communities to work in the sex industry, they 
qualified as exploited women in need of assistance, even when they personally 
denied that they experienced harm in the brothels.12 That they may have paid others 
to facilitate their migration was presented as further evidence of their exploitation.  
Nearly every anti-trafficking organization in Thailand had a different 
perspective on this situation. The explicitly feminist organizations unanimously 
supported the women, organizing letter-writing campaigns decrying the treatment 
of these detained sex workers and writing scathing white papers to bring public 
attention to the situation.13 The Western evangelical organization that initiated the 
raid on the basis of their own brothel research claimed that they had orchestrated 
the rescue because two or three children were trapped against their will in the 
brothel.14 It was only in my interview of a Thai-European man who worked 
extensively in anti-trafficking efforts that I came to appreciate the complexity of the 
situation surrounding this particular raid. He identified the myriad perspectives 
from which individuals and organizations perceived trafficking for sexual purposes 
and tried, in the context of his work, to maintain good working rapport with all of 
the local groups. In listening to him describe this working style, it became apparent 
to me that the raid and its aftermath crystallized the difficulty he encountered in 
working with organizations that shared no common ground in their approaches to 
trafficking. Although his approach was no more objectively correct than the others, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. Thrupkaew likewise reports that adults were removed from the brothel in question 
and indicates that they were deported. Thrupkaew, supra note 1, at 14. However, during 
the controversy that followed Thrupkaew’s article, IJM placed the following statement on its 
website as part of a letter to the editor submitted to The Nation: “In more than 10 years of 
experience on the frontlines of this field, IJM has found that effective policing can be done 
without infringing on the rights of adult women voluntarily engaging in commercial sex.” 
IJM Letters to the Editor of The Nation, INT’L JUSTICE MISSION, 
http://www.ijm.org/ijmnews/nationletterstoeditor. 
 13. While I observed this firsthand, Thrupkaew, supra note 1, at 13–14, offers further 
confirmation of this observation.  
 14. Again, this observation is based on my own interviews and confirmed by 
Thrupkaew. Id. 
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his appreciation of the conflict helped frame for me the questions that animate this 
Article. 
I do not claim to know all of the nuances of this particular story, and I do not 
narrate it as authoritative. But the fallout from this raid has haunted me since that 
time because it illustrates and exemplifies the ongoing ideological conflict that 
surrounds the trafficking of women for sexual purposes.15 A lack of shared 
dialogue among organizations typifies the anti-trafficking movement, in Thailand 
and elsewhere.16 Rather than coordinating efforts by reaching consensus on at least 
some shared goals, these groups constantly argued among themselves about the 
most basic of concerns and, therefore, could not even broach harder topics.17 This 
particular raid highlighted the extent of disagreement over what could be proper 
interventions and, even more problematically, over who required rescue. The 
organizations never reached agreement on the deeper issues such as the dilemma of 
brothels, when or whether the rescue of adult women is appropriate, or the essential 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. Trafficking does not occur only in the sex trade. Agriculture, food processing, 
manufacturing, domestic labor, public works, and fishing are all industries in which 
trafficking has been documented. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 24, 
36, 47 (2009). However, despite the fact that women are particularly susceptible to 
trafficking due to employers’ beliefs that female laborers are “submissive, cheap, and 
pliable,” id., scholars and activists have reported that the U.S. government overreports sex 
trafficking and underreports trafficking into other labor sectors. Grace Chang & Kathleen 
Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human Trafficking: New Directions and 
Perspectives from the Field(s), 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 317, 324–25 (2007) (observing that 
while the government reports over two-thirds of trafficking cases to be sex trafficking, one 
service provider in Los Angeles reported 40% domestic work, 17% factory work, 17% sex 
work, 13% restaurant work, and 13% servile marriage). I too have written about this problem 
elsewhere. Shelley Cavalieri, The Eyes That Blind Us: The Overlooked Phenomenon of 
Trafficking into the Agricultural Sector, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (proposing 
explanations for why trafficking for sex work is the primary focus of public discourse, 
suggesting why trafficking into agriculture is particularly overlooked, and proposing policy 
interventions to shift attention to trafficking in agriculture). Likewise, trafficking of minors, 
whether into sex work or any other industry, raises a whole separate set of issues, as 
children’s capacity for consent obviously differs from that of women, but what qualifies as a 
child likewise varies from country to country. See Jyoti Sanghera, Unpacking the Trafficking 
Discourse, in TRAFFICKING AND PROSTITUTION RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
MIGRATION, SEX WORK AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 13 (Kamala Kempadoo ed., 2005). While all 
of these concerns about trafficking are critical, they are also outside the scope of this Article.  
 16. The lack of reliable data also hinders efforts to prevent trafficking and address its 
effects on trafficked persons. The incidence of human trafficking remains difficult to 
quantify due to the fact that trafficked persons in all labor sectors remain hidden populations 
who are engaged in stigmatized and illegal behavior, who are difficult to locate, and who 
may refuse to cooperate in research or give “unreliable answers to protect their privacy.” 
Guri Tyldum & Anette Brunovskis, Describing the Unobserved: Methodological Challenges 
in Empirical Studies on Human Trafficking, in DATA AND RESEARCH ON HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING: A GLOBAL SURVEY 17, 18 (Frank Laczko & Elzbieta Gozdziak eds., 2005).  
 17. Again, this observation is based on my own interviews and confirmed by 
Thrupkaew, supra note 1, at 14, who notes that “[e]ven the other anti-trafficking groups 
couldn’t get along with [the evangelical organization].” That conflict existed between these 
groups is well documented.  
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acceptability of sex work. This raid demonstrated that the organizations simply 
could not agree on how to engage with the problem, much less on any shared 
ideological premises from which to coordinate their efforts.18 In the absence of 
coordinated anti-trafficking efforts, these organizations wasted enormous amounts 
of time infighting rather than providing direct assistance to the myriad trafficked 
and voluntary sex workers in Thailand who might have benefited from social 
services aid.19  
From a theoretical perspective, this Thai scenario displays the ideological chasm 
that divides anti-trafficking organizations. Whereas in this particular scenario the 
abolitionist organization was evangelical Christian, a number of feminist groups 
also share abolitionist values.20 Although their first principles differ dramatically, 
both kinds of abolitionist organizations hold in common a fundamental instinct that 
consent to the sale of sexual labor is problematic. Beginning from this premise, 
feminist abolitionist organizations articulate a gender-based critique of the social 
conditions that create the economic desperation underlying women’s choice to 
engage in sexual labor.21 Further, they advocate the ultimate abolition of all forms 
of sexual labor as the solution to the coercive choice of engagement in sex work.22 
Yet as they cannot fully explain the private choices that individual women make in 
the context of conditions of social oppression and economic desperation, their 
account offers a narrow critique focused solely on the sexuality inherent in the 
labor, without acknowledging the other aspects of women’s lives that shaped their 
choices to perform sexual labor.  
The sex-worker-rights organizations examined the raid from the opposite 
perspective. Beginning with an initial reliance on the concept of self-determination, 
these organizations asserted that the women in the brothel had chosen to be there 
and that the raid’s forcible removal of them was a fundamentally unacceptable 
abridgement of their autonomy. As the women worked of their own volition, were 
free to stay or leave, and were not in debt bondage, the conditions of their work 
were consistent with their autonomy. Further, the sex-worker-rights organizations 
emphasized the particularized context of these women’s choices. Faced with the 
option of sexual abuse and hunger at the hands of the Burmese junta, these 
organizations asserted that the choice to live and work in a brothel was a rational 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. The same conflict has been identified in on-the-ground intervention in sex work and 
trafficking in other contexts as well. See, e.g., MEREDITH RALSTON & EDNA KEEBLE, 
RELUCTANT BEDFELLOWS: FEMINISM, ACTIVISM AND PROSTITUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES 52–62 
(2009).  
 19. See Thrupkaew, supra note 1, at 15 (discussing how sex-worker-rights organizations 
would help women avoid raids and deal with their aftermath).  
 20. The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), discussed infra Part I, is the 
most notable of the feminist anti-prostitution organizations. CATW’s mission statement 
begins with the following paragraph: “The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women 
(CATW) is a non-governmental organization that promotes women’s human rights. It works 
internationally to combat sexual exploitation in all its forms, especially prostitution and 
trafficking in women and children, in particular girls.” An Introduction to CATW, COAL. 
AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, http://www.catwinternational.org/about/index.php.  
 21. See infra Part I.  
 22. See infra Part I. 
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decision that individuals made based on the circumstances of their lives in Burma.23 
However, by framing brothel work as a series of individual decisions, these groups 
overlooked the social influences that constrained the range of options available to 
women who chose to engage in sexual labor. 
These practical, activist positions on trafficking share important connections to 
the strains of feminist theory that provide their underlying rationales.24 The 
abolitionist movement is closely tied to the dominance feminism school of thought, 
paradigmatically defined by the work of Catharine MacKinnon.25 In the context of 
sex work generally and trafficking specifically, Kathleen Barry and others have 
articulated the nuances of the application of the dominance feminism model to this 
issue.26 Other feminist authors, notably Jo Doezema and Kamala Kempadoo, 
discuss the sex-worker-rights position, which possesses two sets of roots. First, it 
arises in significant part from a liberal vision of trafficking and its critique of 
dominance feminist theory.27 Second, in important and largely unstated ways, it 
draws on poststructuralist feminism’s rejection of gender essentialism.28 Martha 
Nussbaum also offers an explicitly liberal vision of trafficking and sex work from a 
more specifically philosophical position.29  
The weaknesses and strengths of these strains of feminist theory closely parallel 
the problems articulated above regarding approaches to sex trafficking. The 
dominance school of feminism brilliantly offers a scathing critique of gender and 
sexualized privilege in society, and at times extends the critique equally well to the 
arenas of first-world privilege. Yet dominance feminism provides this critique in 
such a universalized way that it fails to account for the individual circumstances of 
particular women’s lives. In short, dominance feminism extends its critique too far, 
compulsorily drawing all women into its purview, and offering abolition as its 
singular solution predicated solely on a stunted view of trafficking. Feminists 
focused on sex-worker rights, in contrast, insightfully leverage liberal thought to 
appreciate the condition of individual women’s lives and place women’s decisions 
within a personal context; they look to poststructuralism30 to help construct a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. Even a former staffer of the IJM has noted that the women “were making a rational 
decision under horrible conditions—to be raped for free in Burma or paid to do commercial 
sex work is one situation. For me, they are making a rational decision, but that’s a decision 
no one should have to make.” Thrupkaew, supra note 1, at 16 (quoting Christa Crawford, 
former IJM country director in Thailand).  
 24. Chantal Thomas has discussed these two general camps in her considerations of 
governance feminism and sex trafficking. Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & 
Chantal Thomas, From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, 
Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance 
Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 348–51 (2006). 
 25. See infra Part I.  
 26. See infra Part I. 
 27. See infra notes 88–95 and accompanying text.  
 28. See infra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.  
 29. See infra notes 148–60 and accompanying text.  
 30. Poststructuralism “emphasizes the variety, complexity, and contingency of the 
discursive influences that shape subject formation.” Kathryn Abrams, Afterword, Critical 
Strategy and the Judicial Evasion of Difference, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1426, 1437 n.52 
(2000). Put another way, poststructuralism rejects a monolithic account of a group and 
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feminism cognizant of individual difference. But they neglect the broader social 
context in which individual women make private life choices, which is a crucial 
element of a feminist social critique.  
This Article articulates a new feminist approach to the trafficking of women for 
sexual purposes. Drawing on existing feminist scholarship that both appreciates the 
constrained autonomy within which individuals make decisions and proffers a more 
generalized condemnation of patriarchal social structures, this project enlists both 
dominance and liberal feminism to stake out a middle ground—a third way—
between the poles of victimhood and agency.31 Rather than focusing on the 
ideological battle over women’s bodies as represented in the trafficking and sex 
work debates, this Article offers a new model that properly conceptualizes 
trafficked women and voluntary transnational sex workers and highlights 
preventative and interventionist approaches consistent with this vision of who these 
women are. While focusing on trafficking for sex work because of the generative 
force of feminist legal theory, these interventions are equally useful in addressing 
trafficking into any labor sector.32  
Part I lays out the dominance feminist approach to sex work in general, and 
trafficking specifically, offering a critique of the weaknesses of this approach. This 
Part simultaneously identifies the strands of this line of theorizing that might be 
salvaged to offer an alternative to the existing bifurcated approach to trafficking.  
Part II similarly articulates the main arguments of sex-worker-rights advocates, 
contextualized in their liberal theoretical origins. This Part attends to the role of 
                                                                                                                 
captures ambiguity and heterogeneity within ostensible groups. Within feminist discourse, 
poststructuralists typically adopt a standpoint in which intersecting identities are identified 
and often valued. I am grateful to Kathryn Abrams for our lengthy discussions of the 
poststructuralist implications of this Article.  
 31. Aya Gruber, Cyra Choudhury, Leigh Goodmark, and Laura T. Kessler have 
identified this rejection of the agent/object dichotomy as one of the three major tenets of an 
evolving neofeminism. They identify neofeminism as a new movement in feminist legal 
theory that moves beyond the three key feminist orthodoxies of absolutism, the use of police 
power to affect change, and the acceptance of the agent/object dichotomy. Aya Gruber, 
Leigh Goodmark, Cyra Choudhury & Laura Kessler, University of Baltimore Feminist Legal 
Theory Conference: Workshop on Neofeminism (Mar. 4, 2010); see also Aya Gruber, Cyra 
Choudury, Leigh Goodmark, Frank Rudy Cooper & Shelley Cavalieri, Fifteenth Annual 
LatCrit Conference: NeoFeminism: Exploring New Feminist Analyses and Methodologies 
(Oct. 8, 2010).  
 32. The research and discourse on trafficking overemphasizes trafficking for sexual 
purposes to the exclusion of scholarly and public attention to trafficking into different labor 
sectors. Although trafficking itself is notoriously difficult to quantify properly, this reporting 
bias generates data skewed in the direction of trafficking for sexual purposes. Elzbieta M. 
Gozdziak & Elizabeth A. Collett, Research on Human Trafficking in North America: A 
Review of Literature, in DATA AND RESEARCH ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 15, at 99, 
117 (observing that in the North American context, “[a] great deal of research has focused on 
trafficking for sexual exploitation, to the detriment of investigating trafficking for bonded 
labour and domestic servitude”); see also Liz Kelly, “You Can Find Anything You Want”: A 
Critical Reflection on Research on Trafficking in Persons Within and into Europe, in DATA 
AND RESEARCH ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 15, at 235, 235 (offering “an attempt to 
move beyond the focus on trafficking for sexual exploitation to include that for domestic 
service and labour exploitation”).  
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poststructuralism in shaping a growing movement of theorists and activists who 
attend to the particularity of the situations of women of the global South, rejecting a 
monolithic understanding of “woman,” even in discussions of trafficking for sexual 
purposes. It offers a critical assessment of this theoretical model while identifying 
the elements of this approach that are most promising for a new articulation of how 
to do feminist law and policy making in a manner that critiques societies but 
continues to properly apprehend women as individuals.  
Part III articulates a new third-way approach to trafficking by reconciling the 
salvageable strands of the above two models and suggesting the basic tenets of a 
new public policy approach that grows from third-way feminism. Finally, it 
concludes by showing how these tenets can generate specific public policies that 
enact this set of feminist principles in interventions in the lives of trafficked 
women.  
Part IV connects this third-way feminist theory and policy to scholarship on the 
capabilities approach to human development, observing that this kind of third-way 
feminist policy intervention resonates deeply with the effective and original 
approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum on how to properly conceptualize 
development work. This Part concludes by noting how development and human 
rights law that properly apprehends the intended beneficiary can generate 
meaningful, lasting change in the lives of women.  
I. DOMINANCE FEMINISM AND SEX WORK 
A. Sex Work as Oppression: An Overview of Dominance Feminism 
By fundamentally questioning the fabric of gender relations in society, the 
dominance feminist model has radically shaped contemporary feminist discourse. 
Beginning with the primary assertion that men’s sexual coercion of women creates 
and sustains the ongoing social inequalities that pervade relationships between the 
genders in all aspects of modern society, dominance feminism has broadly 
addressed many issues that are pressing to the women’s rights movement.33 A 
wide-ranging group of dominance feminist theorists has considered pornography,34 
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. For example, Catharine MacKinnon has litigated, drafted amicus briefs, served as an 
expert trial witness, and consulted on others’ litigation regarding myriad feminist issues, 
including rape, sexual harassment, and pornography. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (MacKinnon as coauthor of brief on hostile environment forms 
of sexual harassment); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236–37 (2d Cir. 1995) (MacKinnon 
representing a group of women in a mass tort action under the Alien Tort Claims Act against 
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, asserting that they were the victims “of various 
atrocities, including brutal acts of rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, and 
summary execution, carried out by Bosnian-Serb military forces as part of a genocidal 
campaign conducted in the course of the Bosnian civil war”).  
 34. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981). 
Andrea Dworkin’s work on pornography typifies the way that dominance feminist thinkers 
not only generated rich explanatory theories of gender relations, but also engaged in 
campaigns for legal change, cognizant of this growing understanding of the nature of sexual 
oppression.  
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sexual harassment,35 and other forms of sexualized power through this analytical 
lens, assessing the prevalence of sexualized domination throughout women’s 
lives.36 From its radical roots thirty years ago, this school of thought has generated 
a broad-based awareness of the ways in which sexualized coercion is a basic aspect 
of society that escapes public awareness because of its hegemonic control over 
everyday social encounters.  
Sex work and the trafficking of women for sexual purposes have also fallen 
under the scrutiny of dominance feminist theorists; Kathleen Barry has perhaps 
become the most influential of these writers, not only because of the impact of her 
scholarship, but also because she translated her academic interests into activism 
through her involvement in founding and directing the Coalition Against 
Trafficking in Women.37 Female Sexual Slavery, published in 1979, marked a 
fundamental re-visioning of the meaning of women’s sexual labor in male-
dominated society, consistent with the paradigm-shifting work of the other 
dominance feminists.38 
Drawing on the scholarship of other dominance feminists including Kate Millet, 
Susan Griffin, and Susan Brownmiller, in Female Sexual Slavery, Barry places all 
forms of sexual labor in what she called the “rape paradigm,” in which rape is a 
political act rather than an individuated experience of individual women.39 By 
characterizing all forms of commercial sexual activity as rape, to which no woman 
can consent, Barry frames the entire discussion of commercial sex in the terms of 
the rape paradigm.40 Advancing from these general principles of dominance 
feminism, Barry rapidly jumps from stating that sexual domination defines 
women’s lives in society to equating all forms of sexualized domination, including 
prostitution and the trafficking of women, due to their shared pervasive context.41  
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 
(1979).  
 36. “Pornography and prostitution, including erotic dancing, are blood sports of male 
supremacy.” CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Pornography Left and Right, in WOMEN’S LIVES, 
MEN’S LAWS 327, 341 (2005). 
 37. KATHLEEN BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY 5, 17 (1995) [hereinafter 
BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY]; see also Jo Doezema, Forced to Choose: Beyond 
the Voluntary v. Forced Dichotomy, in GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND 
REDEFINITION 34, 37 (Kamala Kempadoo & Jo Doezema eds., 1998) (discussing the history 
of CATW). 
 38. KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY (New York Univ. Press 1984) (1979) 
[hereinafter BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY]. This book laid bare the politicized nature of 
relationships between men and women, focusing on how power pervades both public and 
private negotiations over sex. 
 39. Id. at 40–42.  
 40. See id. at 41. Barry likewise wove other forms of women’s sexual domination into 
the fabric of sexually oppressive circumstances in which all women live and discussed the 
sexual subjugation of women in all kinds of intimate relationships as part of the problem of 
sexualized dominance. Id. 
 41. Id. at 41–42. Barry here explicitly parallels MacKinnon’s central insight that the 
experience of sexualized domination is a defining characteristic of women’s lives in a 
gender-subordinating society. While Barry discusses this concept in the context of her work 
on trafficking and commercial sexual activity, she is by no means the only scholar to make 
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Claiming that “virtually the only distinction that can be made between traffic in 
women and street prostitution is that the former involves crossing international 
borders,” Barry refuses the traditional distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary sexual labor.42 Instead, she creates the category of “sexual slavery,” 
and includes within it both international trafficking of women for sexual purposes 
and forced street prostitution.43 In short, she shifts the analysis from one of the 
means by which women entered sex work to one that focuses on the ultimate end of 
sex work, which she considers to be wholly exploitative, in an attempt to moot 
counterarguments to her conflation of all prostitution with trafficking for sexual 
purposes.44 Because pimps, recruiters, and others who benefit from prostitution use 
force or violence in many cases, she suggests that all prostitution is compelled or 
violent.45 The net effect is a monolithic account of all kinds of sex work applied to 
all women working in sexual labor, no matter how they began the work or what 
prompted them to perform it.  
However, Barry’s early work was unselfconsciously inconsistent in equating 
voluntary and involuntary sex work. Female Sexual Slavery, for example, faulted 
legal authorities for their “inability . . . to distinguish between victims and 
volunteers”46 and recognized that not all women are forced or defrauded into 
                                                                                                                 
these kinds of comprehensive connections between forms of sexualized oppression. For 
example, Andrea Dworkin observes how pornography’s major theme is male power, 
expressed in myriad forms. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 34, at 24–25. If anything, 
this kind of thinking on sexual violence and gendered subjugation is the shared connection 
that allows Barry, MacKinnon, and others to hold in common the name of dominance 
feminist. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE 
STATE (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY].  
 42. BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY, supra note 38, at 7. This differentiation between 
voluntary and involuntary prostitution dates back at least as far as discussions about the 
“white slave trade,” the phrase used to describe the traffic in women around the turn of the 
twentieth century. Doezema, supra note 37, at 35–36. Morally defensible women, known as 
“white slaves,” were the ones tricked into participation in the sexual labor market. Id. Those 
who knowingly entered the market were simply common prostitutes. Id. The point of the 
distinction was to differentiate the morally pure, who warranted rescue and aid because they 
were victims, from the fallen, who had volitionally begun the work and therefore were 
culpable for any subsequent harm.  
 43. BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY, supra note 38, at 7. She conflated the two 
phenomena by first rejecting the importance of the procurement strategy that pimps or 
recruiters use, portraying it as a false dichotomy. Id. In place of this distinction, she 
emphasized the material conditions of women who work as sexual laborers. Id. Because both 
women who have been coerced, kidnapped, or defrauded and women who have willingly 
entered the industry labor under the same conditions of sexualized domination, Barry posited 
that these conditions were the true locus of the violence perpetrated against women in 
“sexual slavery.” Id. 
 44. In so doing, Barry replicated the logic of the white slavery debates of the early 
twentieth century, which characterized all commercial sex transactions as inherently violent. 
For an outstanding historical discussion of consent and women’s sexuality, see PAMELA 
HAAG, CONSENT: SEXUAL RIGHTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 84 
(1999). 
 45. BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY, supra note 38, at 7–8. 
 46. Id. at 60.  
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entering prostitution against their will.47 Yet rather than using these observations to 
acknowledge the limitations of her theoretical model, Barry instead suggests that 
the examination of an individual woman’s motivation for entering sex work is 
merely demonstrative of bias and victim blaming.48 To focus on the means or 
motives by which women enter sex work, rather than the harm they suffer therein, 
masks the injury and blames the woman for what happened, instead of looking to 
the actual social cause, which is the pervasive sexual domination of women.49 In 
place of focusing on the complicity of women in their own oppression, Barry 
recommends foregrounding the actual working conditions of women in sexual 
labor, which escapes an individualist focus and generates a politicized, collective 
understanding of the societal source of sexual oppression.50 
Indeed, Female Sexual Slavery’s most important contribution is the radical 
analytic shift that it proposes for understanding the social meaning of prostitution. 
Prior to the advent of dominance feminism, prostitution was traditionally framed as 
an economic transaction, building from the trite expression that it is the oldest 
profession in the world.51 Critiques of prostitution focused on economic 
exploitation as the primary axis of oppression that sex workers experienced. But 
Barry shifts this focus, instead enlisting the primary analytical axis of the 
dominance feminist school: gender.52 By focusing explicitly on the gendered nature 
of sexual slavery, Barry swings from an economic analysis to a solely gender-based 
one.53 She rejects the practice of equating male prostitution with female 
prostitution, noting that “[t]he victimization and enslavement to which women are 
subject in male-dominated society find no equivalent in male experience.”54 
Prostitution and trafficking, under Barry’s dominance feminism model, are 
exclusively about the sexualized oppression of women by men. This represents a 
shift to understanding prostitution and its effect on women as a class, rather than as 
isolated, discrete individuals.55  
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. Id. at 84.  
 48. See id.  
 49. The application of this approach in the arena of trafficking closely mimics its more 
common usage in the treatment of rape in general. See, e.g., Amy Grubb & Julie Harrower, 
Attribution of Blame in Cases of Rape: An Analysis of Participant Gender, Type of Rape and 
Perceived Similarity to the Victim, 13 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 396 (2008) 
(documenting how victim blaming functions in rape cases).  
 50. See BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY, supra note 38, at 85.  
 51. See id. at 9–10. In this conception of prostitution, it is a predictably age-old 
economic exchange that women sell sex to men as a mainstay of the economy. Women enter 
prostitution much as they would choose any other form of money-making activity, thus 
primarily shaping a vision of sex work as about money and labor, not sex, gender, and 
power.  
 52. See id. Again, Barry here theorized in the good company of her dominance feminist 
comrades. MacKinnon’s post-Marxist analysis and Barry’s reconceptualization of 
prostitution as a secondarily economic transaction are cut from the same cloth. For 
MacKinnon on this point, see, for example, MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 41, 
at 113. 
 53. BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY, supra note 38, at 9–10. 
 54. Id. at 11.  
 55. See BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY, supra note 37, at 9. This gendered, 
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In The Prostitution of Sexuality, Barry reconceptualizes Female Sexual Slavery 
to make her arguments more pertinent to the substance of the feminist conversation 
on trafficking and prostitution in the middle of the 1990s,56 moving from a focus on 
“the sexuality of prostitution” and all kinds of sexual exploitation to a new venture 
focused on the “prostitution of sexuality” and commodified sexual activity in 
particular.57 It reflects the public legal engagement of dominance feminism, 
including the passage of the “Dworkin-MacKinnon ordinances”58 and the 
international human rights involvement on the issue of trafficking,59 documenting 
how these scholars’ theories supported the public feminist actions of the 1980s and 
1990s. The rise of legal reform seeking to embody dominance feminist principles 
removed the topic from solely theoretical scholarly discourse and placed it squarely 
within the public legal arena, thus rendering dominance feminist discussions of 
trafficking and sex work especially relevant to ongoing public debates. 
The Prostitution of Sexuality makes explicit many of the unstated premises that 
Barry had employed in Female Sexual Slavery, a point that Barry acknowledges 
early in the second text.60 The Prostitution of Sexuality unambiguously states 
Barry’s belief that the consensual engagement in prostitution is both a logical 
impossibility and, at its foundation, the wrong analysis of the phenomenon.61 
Building from the initial dominance feminist premise that sexual domination 
defines the whole of women’s experience, Barry asserts that the reduction of 
women from people to the sexualized object of the body is the origin of gendered 
oppression.62 Because this reduction is the central element of women’s class-based 
experience in the world, Barry fundamentally rejects the liberal notion of consent 
as the dispositive factor in the description of domination.63 Instead, she posits that 
                                                                                                                 
group-based analysis is reflective of the traditional feminist epistemology that refused to 
minimize individual experience, instead proclaiming its class-based analysis under the aegis 
of “the personal is political.”  
 56. Id. at 15–19. 
 57. Id. at 11. This book exists at the nexus of feminist theory and law, and specifically 
attends to the prevalence of legal intervention as the primary way dominance feminists as a 
group brought their theoretical positions to practical fruition. 
 58. Id. at 3. Dworkin and MacKinnon proposed a model anti-pornography civil rights 
ordinance. See ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN’S EQUALITY 138–42 (1988). At least some jurisdictions, 
including Indianapolis, passed a variation of this ordinance, though it was ultimately 
declared unconstitutional for violation of the First Amendment. See Kelly Ann Cahill, Note, 
Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption of the Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work 
Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1146 n.204 (1995) (citing 
American Booksellers Assoc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475 
U.S. 1001 (1986)).  
 59. By shifting the discourse away from the issue of consent, dominance feminists 
accomplished the insertion of their philosophy directly into the legal regime that now 
controls the issue of trafficking internationally. BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY, 
supra note 37, at 4–6.  
 60. Id. at 9. 
 61. See id. at 17. In contrast, Female Sexual Slavery had merely danced around the topic 
of consent.  
 62. Id. at 23.  
 63. Id. 
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the key failing of liberal theory in understanding the sexual domination of women 
is its inability to properly frame oppression due to its excessive reliance on the role 
of consent.64 In place of a liberal conception of the individual as the actor in 
question, Barry advances a sweeping critique of the sexualized and gendered 
domination of women that pervades social life, stating, “In this work I am shifting 
from the nearly singular standard of consent or force in the determination of 
violation to its full human, interactive bodied experience, to span the range of 
oppression from individualized coercion to class domination.”65 By rejecting the 
importance of the liberal ideas of consent or individuated volition in assessing 
whether domination has occurred, Barry thus prepares the way for a sweeping 
reconceptualization of both the class-based nature of oppression and the experience 
of sexualized domination.66  
The centerpiece of Barry’s critique is her four-pronged description of the ways 
in which prostitution “socially constructs the sexual exploitation of women.”67 
Prostitution sex distances women’s very selves from the act of prostitution, or 
causes a kind of internal fragmentation for women who do sex work.68 It causes 
women to disengage themselves from the work they do and the ways they spend 
their time.69 Prostitution demands that women dissociate themselves from the work 
or segment themselves into parts for purchase by men.70 Finally, women who 
perform sex work experience disembodiment and remove themselves from the 
work they do in order to survive it with their identities intact.71 Barry uses this 
analysis to bolster the claim made in Female Sexual Slavery: that no woman can 
choose to do the work of prostitution for two reasons. First, it involves a level of 
self-harm to which no woman could consent; second, no other meaningful labor 
option exists, which renders choice impossible.72 The sum of this four-part 
proposition thus supports her universalized approach to prostitution and trafficking: 
as all women are exploited, no matter how they entered the sex trade, the same 
theoretical explanation of their condition is appropriate in all cases. One theory of 
sex work accounts for the experiences of literally every woman engaged in it.  
At its essence, then, Barry offers a framework for the consideration of 
prostitution and trafficking for sexual purposes that views both phenomena 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 23–24. In so doing, she also stakes out clearly her break from liberal feminist 
thought, which typified the earliest years of feminist theory and activism. See, e.g., JOHN 
STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (1869), reprinted in MILL 133, 133 (Alan Ryan 
ed., 1997) (“That the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the two 
sexes—the legal subordination of one sex to the other—is wrong in itself, and now one of 
the chief hindrances to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle 
of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the 
other.”).  
 66. BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY, supra note 37, at 24. 
 67. Id. at 29. 
 68. Id. at 30. 
 69. Id. at 31. 
 70. Id. at 34–35.  
 71. Id. at 35. 
 72. Id. at 29–33.  
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singularly through the lens of the subjugation of women as a monolithic class on 
the basis of sexualized domination. A number of other scholars have adopted, 
refined, and expanded on Barry’s groundbreaking work on female sexual labor 
since the publication of Female Sexual Slavery, and especially since the more 
recent publication of The Prostitution of Sexuality.73 The model of feminism that 
Barry and others who share her philosophy espouse presents a radical 
reconceptualization of the meaning of sexual labor in contemporary society.74 
Other scholar-activists have heavily engaged in the continued discourse that 
Barry’s earliest writings prompted, persistently and publicly advocating the 
abolition of all forms of commercial sexual activity.75 Their organizations sponsor 
activist groups of former sex workers, domestic and international lobbying efforts, 
and active engagement in the public and scholarly discourse, and have brought 
Barry’s theories to practical fruition. While these newer scholars have contributed 
original voices to the conversation and have brought public attention to the general 
theoretical orientation of dominance feminists, their foci differ in meaningful ways 
from the theory that Barry forwarded initially.  
More recently, dominance feminists have increased their focus on the role of 
intersecting axes of oppression in prostitution and trafficking for sexual purposes, 
particularly when considering international trafficking situations.76 While Barry 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. Indeed, Barry’s terminology of “sexual slavery” has been adopted even by many 
who write in a more journalistic manner on human trafficking. See, e.g., ANDREA PARROT & 
NINA CUMMINGS, SEXUAL ENSLAVEMENT OF GIRLS AND WOMEN WORLDWIDE (2008); TO 
PLEAD OUR OWN CAUSE: PERSONAL STORIES BY TODAY’S SLAVES 1 (Kevin Bales & Zoe Trod 
eds., 2008). However, the use of the terminology of slavery, particularly in the United States, 
with its history of legally entrenched chattel slavery of imported African people and their 
descendants, to describe indentured sexual labor raises real questions in the legal context of 
whether this terminology is legally accurate or a form of politicizing the phenomenon to 
raise public attention.  
 74. See BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY, supra note 38; BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF 
SEXUALITY, supra note 37. 
 75. These most notably include Evelina Giobbe, who created the organization known as 
WHISPER (Women Hurt in Systems of Prostitution Engaged in Revolt) in 1986, and Janice 
Raymond, one of the co-executive directors of CATW (Coalition Against Trafficking of 
Women). BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY, supra note 37, at 5–6. Giobbe and 
Raymond have been involved in anti-trafficking and anti-prostitution efforts for decades, 
largely as activists and organizational leaders. While Raymond does write, her books do not 
focus on the issue of sex work. See, e.g., JANICE G. RAYMOND, A PASSION FOR FRIENDS: 
TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF FEMALE AFFECTION (1986); JANICE G. RAYMOND, TRANSSEXUAL 
EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE SHE-MALE (1979); JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS: 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN’S FREEDOM (1993). 
 76. Catharine MacKinnon has acknowledged the essentialist critique of dominance 
feminism, but dismisses it as “a sneer, a tool of woman-bashing, with consequences that far 
outrun its merits,” asserting instead that she does not “relegate women of color to footnotes 
and brackets, . . . assume that all women are white, . . . [or] require women to choose 
between their ethnic identification and their gender.” CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Keeping It 
Real: On Anti-“Essentialism,” in WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS, supra note 36, at 84, 88. 
MacKinnon argues that the charge of essentialism has “undermined the contributions that 
dominance theory, as developed in feminism, could make to antiracist work. Feminist 
dominance theory is a theory of social and political inequality as such. It builds on 
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dealt with this issue as one entwined with, but secondary to, the sexualized 
domination of women in prostitution,77 other dominance theorists have considered 
multiple forms of oppression as ways that dominance actually functions in the lives 
of real women.78 Racism, classism, and colonialist privilege function in 
combination to “exacerbate oppressive social and economic conditions that make 
poor women and women of color particularly vulnerable to prostitution.”79 In the 
trafficking and prostitution context, the dominance feminist analysis of sexualized 
                                                                                                                 
antiracism and builds it in.” Id. at 89–90. MacKinnon raises the specter that anti-essentialism 
“corrodes group identification and solidarity and leaves us with one-at-a-time personhood: 
liberal individualism.” Id. at 90. Thus, she maintains that dominance feminism offers “a 
reality of group oppression that exists whether we identify with our group or not.” Id. 
 77. Barry attempts to inform her analysis with an acknowledgment of intersecting axes 
of oppression, including race and colonialism, but this effort is somewhat incomplete. See 
BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY, supra note 37, at 24. She suggests that racial 
difference, like sexual difference, is used to justify the oppression specifically of women of 
color in the commodification of sexuality. See id. She notes that men who are johns often 
enlist racialized stereotypes as an element of the sexual performance they compel from 
women, see id. at 34, a phenomenon that I have noted firsthand; the experiences of Nigerian 
women trafficked into Southern Italy are rife with racialized violence perpetrated against 
them by white men.  
  Yet Barry fails to appreciate the compounding effect of racial stereotypes in creating 
the demand for sex workers from particular geographic locales and specific ethnic identities, 
which I have observed in many parts of the world. In Italy, Nigerian participants in the 
commercial sex sector are streetwalkers. Women from former Soviet republics usually work 
in brothels. Italian women and other western Europeans are most commonly call girls. In 
Southeast Asia, the shade of an indigenous sex worker’s skin can dictate the level of the 
commercial sex industry in which she may work. Streetwalkers are uncommon in Thailand, 
but the darkest-skinned indigenous women work in the most ramshackle of the brothels, 
which manual laborers frequent, while fairer indigenous and Thai women can work in the 
karaoke bars that are the hub of student life. The fairest-skinned women with the best 
command of the spoken Thai language work in high-priced clubs where Thai, Japanese, and 
Korean corporate employees transact business.  
  Likewise, Barry recognizes that conditions of economic disparity, feudal marriage, 
and rural poverty render particular, racially oppressed groups of women susceptible to the 
market for sex work. Id. at 175, 178. Yet, she maintains the gendered axis of oppression and 
the sweeping critique of sexualized dominance as her primary explanation for the incidence 
of trafficking and other forms of prostitution, even where other circumstances are more 
central to the compulsion of women into sexual labor. See id. at 196–97. Barry 
acknowledges that these women are not “trafficked” in the traditional sense of the term when 
they choose to engage in sexual labor; she speaks of the choice as a coercive one, not one 
representative of a freely made decision. See id. But she fails to fully comprehend how 
additional axes of oppression in a particular woman’s life might make a choice that appears 
to be constructed by gendered oppression one that actually releases a woman from the most 
pernicious effects of other kinds of oppression present in her life.  
 78. In this regard, Barry’s dominance feminist successors’ writings reflect the important 
work of poststructuralist feminists, who reject singular discourses in favor of ones that have 
been described as “poly-vocal” by poststructuralists such as Marie Ashe. See Marie Ashe, 
Mind’s Opportunity: Birthing a Poststructuralist Feminist Jurisprudence, 38 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 1129, 1169 (1988).  
 79. Vednita Carter & Evelina Giobbe, Duet: Prostitution, Racism and Feminist 
Discourse, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 44–45 (1999). 
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privilege has also been expanded to include an explicitly racial element that 
recognizes the role of white male supremacy as the primary oppressive force in 
sexualized labor.80 Where Barry comfortably posited a single vision of the 
oppression of sex workers, her successors in the dominance school grasp the ways 
that poststructuralism has shown how intersecting axes of oppression complicate 
this vision and make the achievement of a cogent unitary model of oppression 
impossible.81 Poststructuralist scholars thus succeed in rendering the analytic frame 
cognizant of the myriad forms of oppression that jointly create the system of 
sexualized, racialized, and colonialized domination in which victims of human 
trafficking function and survive. This stands in contrast to Barry’s model, which 
considers gender in isolation as the primary way in which all women, including 
women of color, indigenous women, women of the global South, and poor women, 
experience oppression as sex workers.82 Barry’s successors have thus informed 
dominance feminism with the insights that poststructuralism has contributed to 
feminist thought in general.  
B. Weaknesses of Dominance Feminism in the Trafficking Realm 
Yet three primary conceptual problems pervade the work of Kathleen Barry and 
her dominance feminist peers. First, they exploit the lack of definitional clarity 
between voluntary sex work and involuntary trafficked sex work in order to further 
their theoretical position about the exploitative nature of all sexual labor. Second, 
the universalized categorization of all forms of sexual labor as inherently 
exploitative means that the theory refuses to engage with any counterexamples to 
its presumptions and, in effect, fails to account for the lives and experiences of 
myriad women. Third, the pervasive and singular definition of women who are sex 
workers as universally oppressed rejects any liberatory possibility for the role of 
sex work in the lives of the women who perform it.  
As described above in Barry’s work, dominance feminist theory as applied to 
the realm of prostitution and trafficking takes full form in the conflation of 
voluntary and involuntary sex work.83 This technique serves two central purposes. 
First, it shifts the focus away from the liberal approach that centers on autonomy 
and consent. In so doing, dominance feminist theorists on trafficking create the 
oppositional nature of their fundamentally radical approach as set against the 
traditionally liberal conception of the individual. Second, and more importantly for 
the purposes of this analysis, it allows for the broad imposition of the theory on 
ever larger groups of women. Such a propensity for universalizing tends to mask 
the differences between sex workers, the conditions that predicate their entry into 
the sexual labor market, and the situations in which they perform the work of 
commodified sex. Rather than offering a description adequately nuanced to reflect 
the particularity of individual narratives, these universalizing tendencies lose the 
individual in a theory painted in broad strokes. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. See id. at 38, 44–45. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY, supra note 37, at 196–97. 
 83. See supra notes 60–72 and accompanying text. 
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The assertion of such a broadly applied theory that hinges on a monolithic 
account of sexual labor as inherently exploitative overtly disregards all experiences 
of individual sex workers that undermine this theoretical perspective.84 In short, it 
means that the theory accounts for sex workers engaged in pro-sex-work efforts as 
experiencing false consciousness, or as existing in abnormal circumstances that 
thus do not merit analysis, and, therefore, disregards their experiences without 
actually addressing them individually.85 At times, dominance feminists brandish 
outlandishly unqualified, universalized opinions on sex work that dehumanize the 
individual women who engage in it: 
A good prostitute is devoid of a unique and personal identity. She is 
empty space surrounded by flesh into which men deposit evidence of 
their masculinity. She does not exist so that he can. Prostitution done 
correctly begins with theft and ends with the subsequent abandonment 
of self. What remains is essential to the job: the mouth, the genitals, 
anus, breasts . . . and the label.86 
Rather than allowing for a contextualized particularity in approaching the lives 
of women engaged in sex work, such descriptions are intended to obviate relevant 
differences between individuals so that the theory can account for all women. Yet, 
to return to the introductory narrative of this Article, the Shan women of that story 
cannot be described in this way. They claim their own identity, not generated 
within their work but in fact as the predicating element of their work. In the face of 
socially generated oppression on axes of ethnicity and indigeneity, the Shan women 
working in Thai brothels claimed sex work as a means of escape from the 
repression of the Burmese junta. Other commentators on migrant sex work have 
similarly noted that many women leave their country cognizant of the kind of work 
that awaits them, but still migrate for employment purposes to do sex work.87 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. Angela Harris has persuasively discussed how Catharine MacKinnon’s “work, 
though powerful and brilliant in many ways, relies on what [Harris] call[s] gender 
essentialism—the notion that a unitary ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and 
described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience.” 
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 
585 (1990); see also id. at 590–601 (offering a critique of MacKinnon specifically and 
dominance feminism generally). The critique that I offer here of Barry’s treatment of sex 
work resonates with Harris’s insight that a feminist theory that purports to describe women’s 
lives without regard for “realities of experience” is insufficient.  
 85. In her effort to undermine the application of false consciousness theory, Mari J. 
Matsuda defines false consciousness as the idea that members of subordinated classes are 
incapable of offering any valuable insight on their own subordination or that their 
subordination taints their own analysis. Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the 
False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1777–78 (1990). However, Matsuda 
suggests that academics have a strong incentive to believe that poor and working people 
have little of value to say about law, social life, or politics. Id. at 1778. 
 86. Carter & Giobbe, supra note 79, at 46 (emphasis omitted). 
 87. See Kinsey Alden Dinan, Migrant Thai Women Subjected to Slavery-Like Abuses in 
Japan, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1113, 1117–20 (2002) (describing the situation of Thai 
women whose migration to Japan to engage in prostitution was facilitated by a trafficker). 
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crude narrative of the dominance feminist approach loses the particularized 
elements of the lives of trafficked women. In the place of individualized nuance, 
broad-based assumptions appear as the central descriptors of the lives of individual 
trafficked women.  
This loss of particularity comes at a cost to the women whom dominance 
feminists claim to describe. Because the theory offers a singular description of the 
meaning of trafficking in the lives of women and leaves no room for ambivalent 
experiences of the phenomenon, it cannot account for the potentially conflicting 
experiences of different women or the complexity of the responses of individual 
women. From a purely theoretical perspective, dominance feminism offers a 
singular perspective on trafficking and no opportunity for dialogue with alternative 
viewpoints. On one hand, this approach encapsulates the potent awareness of the 
harms that accompany sex work and the impact of such injuries on real women. Yet 
dominance feminism also displays a calculated neglect of the freedom or autonomy 
that the work of sexual labor offers in the lives of women who find themselves 
oppressed along the lines of ethnicity and indigeneity. By overlooking the 
potentially liberatory qualities of sex work for women from marginalized groups, 
dominance feminism fails to account for the personal narratives of women whose 
experiences contradict the thrust of the theory. This shortcoming generates societal 
costs as well in preventing the creation of a broader public understanding of the 
possibility of an ambivalent meaning of trafficking and transnational sex work. 
Dominance feminist theory of trafficking renders simple an outrageously complex 
issue and does so by relegating dissenting voices to the margins. 
Beyond these individualized costs to specific sex workers, the unitary 
perspective of dominance feminism also comes at a social price. It denies the 
broader public an accurate understanding of the complexities of trafficking and 
reduces it to a singular phenomenon that a single intervention can solve. This is the 
real expense of dominance feminism to the world: it presents only a limited vision 
of trafficking and then enlists this incomplete model to sell the sole public policy 
intervention of abolition, which alone is insufficient to cause broad-based change in 
the lives of sex workers. Dominance feminists see incisively into the social nature 
of sexual domination, but their generalized theory of dominance fails to account for 
the reality of trafficking, and thus generates legal and public policy interventions 
that offer, at best, partial solutions.  
II. CONSENT, COERCION, AND TRAFFICKING FROM THE LIBERAL FEMINIST 
TRADITION  
A. Liberal Feminist Theory, Poststructuralism, and Sex Work Advocacy 
A liberal conception of the individual as the agent of her own life lies at the 
foundation of the liberal feminist position on the trafficking of women for sexual 
purposes. Whereas the dominance feminist position initially asserts a broad 
characterization of the society into which individuals are thereafter inserted, liberal 
feminists start with the first principle of the equality of all human beings by virtue 
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of their capacity for reason and choice.88 Liberal feminism builds on classical 
liberalism by clarifying that the same notion of equality of men that animates 
traditional liberalism also defines women.89 According to Martha Nussbaum, the 
goal of liberal political theorizing is “to put people into a position of agency and 
choice, not to push them into functioning in ways deemed desirable.”90 At its core, 
liberal political philosophy regards the individual as the primary actor of concern 
and centers its analysis of society on the treatment of and respect for the individual 
and his or her choices.91  
These fundamental tenets of the liberal feminist political model form the 
foundation of the sex-worker-rights position that stands in opposition to the 
dominance feminist model articulated in Part I. Beginning from a rich, liberal 
concept of the individual woman as agent of her own life and choices, proponents 
of a sex-worker-rights model forward a vision of women autonomously choosing to 
engage in sexual labor as they would choose any other form of employment.92 
Exploitation and coercion are duly considered as incompatible with this model of 
sexual labor, but only insofar as they override the choices of an individual.93 
Consistent with the fundamental tenets of classical liberalism, liberal feminist 
advocates of an autonomy-based approach to sexual labor consider the consent of 
an individual woman to be the touchstone for assessing the presence of 
domination.94 The liberal feminist analysis of abuse in the realm of prostitution 
turns on whether engagement in sexual labor is consensual or by force, fraud, or 
coercion.95  
Poststructuralist feminism also informs the perspective of sex-worker-rights 
advocates on trafficking for sexual purposes. Poststructuralism rejects liberal 
feminism’s singular definition of what women are, embracing a more complex 
description that comprehends difference among women and allows for dissent.96 
Poststructuralism is a response to what Angela Harris calls “[t]he need for multiple 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Introduction: Feminism, Internationalism, Liberalism to 
SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 1, 10 (1999). 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. at 11. 
 91. This liberal understanding of the choice of the individual as relevant to the law’s 
treatment of sexuality is a relatively new contribution to American jurisprudence. See 
Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 777, 794–95 (1988). 
 92. For example, Nussbaum’s treatment of sex work and trafficking begins with a 
consideration of the ways in which sexual labor is similar to and different from other ways in 
which individuals take money for the use of their bodies in such work as factory work in a 
chicken processing plant, domestic service, nightclub singing, teaching philosophy, 
providing massages, and what she terms “colonoscopy art.” See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, 
Whether from Reason or Prejudice: Taking Money for Bodily Services, in SEX AND SOCIAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 88, at 276, 276, 280–85. 
 93. See Priscilla Alexander, Feminism, Sex Workers, and Human Rights, in WHORES 
AND OTHER FEMINISTS 83, 91, 93 (Jill Nagle ed., 1997). 
 94. Cf. id. at 93. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See Ashe, supra note 78, at 1169 (discussing the relationship between absolute 
liberalism and “poly-vocal . . . radical feminist insight”).  
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consciousness in the feminist movement” because it has moved feminist thought 
“away from univocal toward multivocal theories of women’s experience.”97 
Although poststructuralist feminist theorists have not expressly focused on 
trafficking and sex work, unlike their liberal and dominance sisters, their authority 
shapes the way some sex-worker-rights advocates theorize trafficking for sexual 
purposes. When scholars of trafficking discuss differences among women, 
accounting for the roles of race, indigeneity, and country of origin in the 
experiences of trafficked women or questioning any singular articulation of what it 
means to be trafficked, they pay tribute to the valuable contributions of 
poststructuralist feminists.98 Although not all sex-worker-rights advocates, who 
typically leverage liberal thought,99 invoke poststructuralist insights, this strain of 
theory is sufficiently prominent in this genre of writing to merit closer examination 
throughout this discussion of sex-worker-rights advocacy.  
International human rights law most clearly evidences the intersection of 
classical liberal feminism with the issue of trafficking. The primary legal 
instruments of international human rights entrench a fundamentally liberal notion 
of rights as rooted in the individual person and abused at the individual level as 
well.100 In part, this focus is an outgrowth of the human rights perspective on the 
liberal conception of the right of the individual to make self-determining choices in 
pursuit of the good and to define those choices independently.101 Because of the 
primacy of the liberal view of human rights in international law, it is predictable 
that the primary international instrument controlling trafficking, the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. Harris, supra note 84, at 586–87. 
 98. See, e.g., Acknowledgments to GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND 
REDEFINITION, supra note 37. 
 99. Jody Freeman likewise “treat[s] prostitutes’ rights groups as having the same 
ideological base as those we might call liberal feminists.” Jody Freeman, The Feminist 
Debate over Prostitution Reform: Prostitutes’ Rights Groups, Radical Feminists, and the 
(Im)possibility of Consent, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 75, 75 (1989). However, it warrants 
mention that most sex-worker-rights advocates would probably eschew being defined as 
liberal, for reasons of the critique offered below.  
 100. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (providing human rights to persons on an individual, rather than 
collective, basis). 
 101. The codification of the Western liberal understanding of the individual and the state 
is more a demonstration of the victory of the West during the initial discussions of human 
rights than any kind of confirmation of the superiority of this position. The ramifications of 
the entrenchment of this version of human rights continue to be experienced in the 
difficulties that the human rights community faces in seeking recognition of economic, 
social, and cultural rights as the equals to the civil and political rights that the global West 
successfully entrenched in the post–World War II period of international law making, just as 
the Cold War began. See Lesley Wexler, The Promise and Limits of Local Human Rights 
Internationalism, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 599, 611 (2010) (“The emphasis on political and 
civil rights, as opposed to economic rights, both kept with domestic commitments and 
allowed criticism of cold war adversaries.”). 
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Children (“Trafficking Protocol”), would continue to enlist a similar vision of the 
individual as the subject of international law on trafficking.102  
During the debates surrounding the passage of the Trafficking Protocol, 
liberalism as captured by international human rights instruments came under attack 
by dominance feminist arguments consistent with the historical abolitionist 
perspective on sex work.103 Sex-worker advocates continued to promote the idea 
that trafficked persons could consent to illicit activity, including prostitution, 
despite the dominance feminist insistence that all sexual labor was trafficking and 
violated women’s human rights, regardless of whether coercion occurred.104 
Feminists favoring sex-worker rights asserted that in the context of codifying legal 
definitions of trafficking, sexual labor was equivalent to any other form of labor 
into which persons could be trafficked.105 As a result, the issue was not the sexual 
nature of the labor, but the way in which the laborer was recruited or transported 
into the work. To prevent the codification of an abolitionist understanding of 
trafficking for sexual purposes, this group sought to define trafficking according to 
the use of coercion in bringing a woman into a situation of trafficking, such that all 
women working as sex workers would not be considered victims of trafficking.106 
While dominance feminists sought to negate the importance of consent in 
trafficking, sex-worker-rights advocates consistently advanced the concept that 
coercion, or the denial of the opportunity for meaningful consent, is the touchstone 
of the definition of trafficking under international human rights law.107 The 
Trafficking Protocol ultimately codified this position by specifying that the consent 
of the individual woman is not enough to overcome the use of coercion so as to 
negate the trafficking.108 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 6. However, it is important to note that the 
Trafficking Protocol itself does not offer a human-rights-centric approach to trafficking. 
Rather, as a protocol supplementing the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 
it takes an expressly law-and-order position, addressing trafficking largely as a criminal 
matter. See id. 
 103. See Jo Doezema, Who Gets to Choose? Coercion, Consent, and the UN Trafficking 
Protocol, in GENDER, TRAFFICKING, AND SLAVERY 20, 21–23 (Rachel Masika ed., 2002). 
 104. Id. At the same time, dominance feminists did not insist on the extension of their 
definition of trafficking to other labor sectors. The goal was to achieve an international 
definition that included all forms of sexual labor as trafficking, so that when any woman was 
transported for the purposes of prostitution, it would qualify as trafficking even where she 
may have consented to the movement and subsequent labor. In contrast, migrant 
farmworkers or domestic workers, for example, could still render meaningful consent to be 
voluntarily transported to engage in their labor sector in another state. See id. 
 105. Id. This perspective is consistent with the reality that both men and women are 
trafficked into agriculture, sweatshop, domestic, restaurant, and other kinds of labor as well 
as into the sexual labor that was the basis of the dominance feminist lobbying efforts in the 
negotiations leading up to the passage of the Trafficking Protocol in 2000. However, human 
rights advocates have noted that all of these labor sectors share the “3D” characteristics: 
difficult, dirty, and dangerous. See Dinan, supra note 87, at 1114. 
 106. See Doezema, supra note 37, at 34. 
 107. See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 288. 
 108. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 3(b). However, dominance feminists offer 
an interpretation of the international instrument consistent with their definition of all 
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Indeed, it was in the context of these public policy conflicts that feminist 
activist-scholars developed a rich theory of consent in relation to the meaning of 
coercion in the context of trafficking. At the most basic level, this crucial stage in 
the international dialogue on prostitution and trafficking acknowledged the agency 
of sex workers.109 Some theorists are careful to note the distinction between women 
who are lured or compelled into performing sexual labor and women who choose to 
engage in the work;110 this analysis applies in a similar way to distinguishing 
between voluntary migration for purposes of prostitution and involuntary 
trafficking.111 Drawing on poststructuralism’s understanding of the multivocal 
experience of women as a class, these theorists focus particular attention on the fact 
that third-world women who may encounter oppressions based in colonialism, 
racism, and indigeneity can still decide to migrate for the purposes of sexual 
labor.112 Or, in the alternative, they may choose to migrate and discover that the 
                                                                                                                 
prostitution as trafficking. The interpretive notes to the Trafficking Protocol contain the 
following statement:  
The travaux préparatoires should indicate that the Protocol addresses the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others and other forms of sexual exploitation 
only in the context of trafficking in persons. The terms “exploitation of the 
prostitution of others” or “other forms of sexual exploitation” are not defined in 
the Protocol, which is therefore without prejudice to how States Parties address 
prostitution in their respective domestic laws. 
Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, Interpretative Notes for the Official Records (travaux préparatoires) of the 
Negotiation of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and 
the Protocols Thereto, ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. A/55/383/Add. 1 (Nov. 3 2000). Dominance 
feminists interpret this to mean that their definition of all sex work as trafficking and thus 
sexual exploitation could be included within “other forms of sexual exploitation.” See Janice 
G. Raymond, The New UN Trafficking Protocol, 25 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 491, 495 
(2002). Thus, while the international law instrument forwards a coercion-based trafficking 
definition, the abolitionists still claim victory in this model due to the explanatory notes. Id. 
Anne Gallagher has suggested that this ambiguity in interpretation will become problematic 
as the Protocol is implemented and international relations are shaped accordingly. Anne 
Gallagher, Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: 
A Preliminary Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 975, 984–88 (2001). 
 109. Doezema, supra note 37, at 40 (noting that United Nations recommendations on 
violence against women of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) began, in the 1990s, to identify the prostitute as a 
subject with rights to be protected, not merely a player complicit in the crime of 
prostitution). 
 110. Cf. Erick Gjerdingen, Note, Suffocation Inside a Cold Storage Truck and Other 
Problems with Trafficking as “Exploitation” and Smuggling as Choice Along the Thai-
Burmese Border, ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 699, 699 (2009) (identifying how the 
exploitation of smuggled migrants who voluntarily sought to cross the Thai-Burmese border 
for work was not recognized by law enforcement because of their volition in leaving 
Burma). 
 111. See Kamala Kempadoo, The Migrant Tightrope: Experiences from the Caribbean, 
in GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION, supra note 37, at 124, 
125–27.  
 112. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 296. 
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only work available to them in their destination country is sexual labor.113 In either 
case, the choice to migrate remains a volitional one consistent with a liberal vision 
of the individual capable of making decisions for his or her own life, informed by 
the poststructuralist awareness of difference among women.  
Reconciling this theory of volitional sex work with the reality that women 
ultimately take different paths to migrate for work in the sex sector can be 
challenging. Theorists problematize these myriad paths in dramatically different 
ways relating to the woman’s ability to maintain her autonomy.114 In the most basic 
sense, some claim that a woman’s decision to work in sexual labor can be a freely 
made, autonomous choice;115 it thus follows that voluntary migration for the same 
labor end could also be envisioned. At the other extreme, there are women who 
encounter coercion consistent with that codified in the Trafficking Protocol 
definition when entering migratory sex work and experience threats, fraud, 
deception, or bribery as the trafficker attempts to assert control.116 The crucial 
difference between these two concepts of autonomy and coercion is the level of 
interference that is permitted before a choice becomes coerced. The Doezema 
definition of choice seems to suggest that simply by merit of having been chosen 
by a woman, the decision becomes volitional or autonomous. In contrast, the 
Trafficking Protocol definition envisions a form of autonomy that can be threatened 
more easily, by the many forms of interference it suggests qualify as coercion. Yet 
the Trafficking Protocol offers what I characterize as a generally liberal vision of 
trafficking for sexual purposes because it theorizes autonomy as an individual 
attribute, which is shaped by poststructuralism insofar as it allows for plural 
definitions or experiences of coercion. Under the Trafficking Protocol, coercive 
social factors infringe on the autonomy of an individual; they do not render groups 
incapable of making autonomous decisions.  
Further obscuring the question of the meaning of coercion is the reality that a 
woman’s understanding of her position in relation to her trafficker changes over 
time.117 A woman may migrate independently, but then be coerced into a position 
of sexual labor while looking for employment abroad. Or, a woman may 
voluntarily place herself in a brothel, having been explicitly deceived about the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. See, e.g., GAIL PHETERSON, Right to Asylum, Migration, and Prostitution, in THE 
PROSTITUTION PRISM 100, 104 (1996). 
 114. Dina Francesca Haynes has identified the fuzzy boundary between trafficking and 
the abuse of migrant laborers, an observation that is accurate in all labor sectors, not only sex 
work. See generally Dina Francesca Haynes, Exploitation Nation: The Thin and Grey Legal 
Lines Between Trafficked Persons and Abused Migrant Laborers, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2009).  
 115. See Doezema, supra note 37, at 37 (discussing the Global Alliance Against 
Trafficking in Women’s stand on the possibility of voluntary prostitution). 
 116. See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 3(a) (defining trafficking based 
primarily on “the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of 
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving 
of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another 
person, for the purpose of exploitation”). 
 117. See Susanne Thorbek, Prostitution in a Global Context: Changing Patterns, in 
TRANSNATIONAL PROSTITUTION: CHANGING PATTERNS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 1, 5 (Susanne 
Thorbek & Bandana Pattanaik eds., 2002). 
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intolerable conditions of work there. Questions abound about the definition of 
consent and the extent of coercion in situations that are not clear-cut; simply 
identifying a victim of trafficking based on a framework of consent and coercion 
can be a challenge.118 Even more complex is the identification of a trafficker—one 
commentator has described traffickers, only half in jest, as “like travel agents, only 
rather more expensive.”119 The ambivalence with which many trafficked women 
regard their traffickers further complicates the goal of respecting women’s 
autonomy, when these relationships can be fraught with multiple meanings.120 
Additional complexity arises in the reality that women make choices to migrate 
for sex work in the context of other influences on their lives, a fact which sex-
worker-rights theorists address in different ways.121 Nussbaum suggests that the 
case of a woman who enters prostitution because of a lack of better economic 
alternatives creates a situation where the woman’s “autonomy has been infringed 
but in a different way” than the woman who has been coerced.122 The individual 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. See id. at 4–6. 
 119. Id. at 5. 
 120. In my own work with trafficked women, I have encountered this problem of 
trafficked women’s ambivalence toward their traffickers. A Nigerian woman with whom I 
worked in Italy had a serious heart condition that had been exacerbated by irregular sleeping 
habits compelled by her trafficker’s insistence that she work the streets each night until 
sunrise. The condition required hospitalization, which I hoped would give her the chance to 
get away from her trafficker and establish independence in Italy. I thus did not inform the 
trafficker of the woman’s hospitalization. However, my client desperately wanted to talk to 
the trafficker because this was her primary source of social support outside the social service 
community. So she asked an Italian doctor with a limited knowledge of English if she could 
use his phone to call “her sister.” His rudimentary English and lack of culturally competent 
knowledge that Nigerian women often refer to acquaintances from the same cultural group 
as sisters led him to oblige her request. I was shocked to arrive at the hospital the next day 
and encounter the trafficker lambasting the doctor for his refusal to release the patient, her 
sex worker. My client rapidly recognized that she was only a business interest to the 
trafficker, who showed no concern with her medical condition, and became enormously 
frustrated at the situation because of the complicated nature of the relationship she had with 
this woman who was simultaneously her pimp, trafficker, countrywoman, and friend. Such 
complications are common in work with trafficked women and mean that concepts of 
autonomy and coercion vacillate. This client perceived herself to be autonomously working 
for this madam, until the moment when the madam revealed herself to be a business manager 
and not a friend. My client, who had entered the hospital feeling a sense of autonomy, left 
cognizant of the coercion under which she truly lived. 
 121. For example, Pheterson discusses the role of political oppression in women’s 
choices to pursue sex work, PHETERSON, supra note 113, at 102, while Kamala Kempadoo 
emphasizes the role of trafficking as a way for women to avoid the negative repercussions of 
globalization on local economies, Kamala Kempadoo, Introduction: Globalizing Sex 
Workers’ Rights to GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION, supra 
note 37, at 1, 17. Kempadoo further observes that sex work is usually just one of many 
activities a woman uses to earn money, and that most of the time it is done “for family well-
being or survival; for working class women to clothe, feed and educate their children; and 
for young women and men to sustain themselves when the family income is inadequate.” Id. 
at 4.  
 122. NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 296.  
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may have the complete personal ability for autonomous decision making including 
the capacity for self-reflection and bargaining, which are pivotal elements of the 
liberal definition of autonomy.123 Yet in the face of only unappealing options, a 
woman’s choice to engage in sex work cannot be termed a truly autonomous one, 
according to Nussbaum’s argument, although it may be the best option from the 
available array of life choices.124 A strict definition of coercion cannot always 
capture the nuances of the softly coercive elements within the lives of women who 
seemingly autonomously choose to migrate for sex work.  
Other theorists draw heavily on poststructuralist and antiessentialist feminism’s 
valuation of actual individual experience to assert the inadequacy of liberal 
autonomy in the face of limited life choices.125 Consistent with the shift in focus 
that the international dialogue on the Trafficking Protocol precipitated, some 
proponents of a sex-worker-rights theory of trafficking suggest that the liberal 
preoccupation with consent as the linchpin for the determination of oppression is an 
illegitimate one because it distracts from what should be more central concerns to 
sex-worker-rights advocates.126 For example, Jo Doezema claims that the 
perpetuation of the voluntary/forced dichotomy imposes “the wrong theoretical 
framework” for the analysis of the experiences of sex workers.127 When consent is 
centered in the conversation about human rights and sex work, abuses perpetrated 
against women who consented to perform the work are too easily ignored.128 
Focusing on whether a woman has agreed to labor masks whether her labor 
conditions are incompatible with her basic human rights.  
Perhaps even more problematically from the perspective of sex-worker-rights 
advocates, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary sex workers becomes 
the contemporary permutation of the innocent/complicit dichotomy129 that has 
plagued legal and public policy debate about women’s sexuality for decades.130 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. I consider these theorists in my general discussion of liberal feminism because their 
conception of feminism remains squarely focused on the individual, not the society, as the 
primary subject of discussion. This, as will be discussed later, is the key distinction between 
what I term dominance feminists and liberal feminists. Although Doezema and others take 
issue with the inadequacy of the liberal definition of autonomy, are concerned about the 
excessive reliance on the voluntary/forced dichotomy, and ultimately arrive at a number of 
poststructuralist and antiessentialist conclusions, there is a connection with traditional 
liberals because of their continued insistence that women’s choices to engage in sex work, 
including migratory sex work, should be taken seriously. Yet their rejection of abstraction, 
including the abstraction of autonomy, and focus on concrete experience is a fundamentally 
antiessentialist turn. See Harris, supra note 84, at 588, 585 (rejecting “the pull of . . . the 
voice of abstract categorization” and “the notion that a unitary, ‘essential’ women’s 
experience can be isolated and described independently of discussing the importance of race, 
class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience”). 
 126. Doezema, supra note 37, at 42.  
 127. Id. at 34–35. 
 128. See id. at 45. 
 129. See id. 
 130. ELAINE JEFFREYS, CHINA, SEX AND PROSTITUTION 74 (2004) (noting the existence of 
the virgin/whore complex).  
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When consent is the basis of analysis, trafficked women can be framed in public 
discourse as victims who are innocent of their own trafficking or entry into sex 
work; by virtue of their lack of complicity, they therefore merit protection from the 
government.131 Innocent trafficking victims stand in categorical opposition to the 
guilty or complicit sex worker who chooses voluntarily to access trafficking 
networks so she can engage in the sexual labor market.132 By framing these two 
groups of trafficked women in opposition to one other and creating a public 
discourse of victimization around the involuntarily trafficked category, the 
voluntary migratory sex workers are excluded from public services offered to the 
group defined as “trafficking victims.”133 In effect, this serves as a way to 
distinguish deserving from undeserving victims in the sex-work realm: the 
deserving victim is the one who lacked knowledge of the work she would do, while 
the undeserving victim knowingly chose to do sex work and, therefore, “asked for” 
any mistreatment that followed.134  
In the policy arena, this distinction functions as a means test for the provision of 
services to trafficked women.135 During the time I spent working in Italy with 
trafficked Nigerian women, I was consistently disappointed that this was the litmus 
test when seeking assistance for my clients. Social services centers time and again 
asked if the women for whom I sought aid knew that they would do sex work prior 
to arriving in Italy. Assistance was inevitably forthcoming for women whose 
traffickers had defrauded them, while women who had chosen to migrate but then 
found themselves trapped in an untenable situation of debt bondage were left to 
their own devices.136 Prior knowledge separated those with access to social services 
from those without such access. The contrast between the treatment of “innocent” 
trafficked women and those who choose voluntarily to engage in the sexual labor 
market is striking, and it demonstrates another way to deny women basic human 
rights because, in this particular scenario, those who exercised agency were treated 
as if they “deserved” the abuses they experienced. From a purely contractual vision 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. Doezema, supra note 37, at 45. 
 132. See Sally Cameron, Trafficking of Women for Prostitution, in TRAFFICKING IN 
HUMAN$: SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS 80, 85–86 (Sally Cameron & 
Edward Newman eds., 2008) (observing that the inherent exploitation in trafficking is 
complicated by the reality of individual women’s agency). 
 133. This dynamic can be seen in the nature of public services offered in the United 
States to victims of trafficking in persons as defined under the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act of 2000. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 22 
U.S.C. §§ 7101–12 (2006). Persons trafficked into any labor sector receive immigration 
benefits, resettlement assistance, job training, and other social services. Id. § 7105. Women 
trafficked into sexual labor are included in this group of recipients of aid, while women who 
voluntarily engage in sexual labor are not. See id. §§ 7102, 7105. 
 134. Cameron, supra note 132, at 85 (“The simplistic view is that to be victimized one 
must be ‘blameless’ in all regards.”). 
 135. Worse yet, where trafficked women exhibit agency, they can be treated as co-
conspirators in the crime of trafficking. Id. 
 136. I frequently responded to such a question with a nonresponsive question of my own: 
Would anyone choose to do this? Usually, this question resulted in my clients receiving 
services. 
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of coercion, their consent to engagement in the sexual labor market served as a 
blanket consent to any subsequent harms at the hands of their traffickers.137 
Living in a social construction of sex work defined by the innocent/complicit 
dichotomy also silences the independent, complicating voices of the sex workers 
whose experiences the framework categorizes. The situation of the “rescue” of the 
Shan women from the Thai brothel highlights the impact of this dynamic.138 
Justifying the brothel raid as the rescue of trafficked minors trapped in a situation 
of compelled prostitution, the organizations that implemented the raid overlooked 
the majority of the women in the brothel who wanted to remain there. In part, the 
intentional disregard for the wishes of the voluntary sex workers was an outgrowth 
of an abolitionist viewpoint that the women could not consent to any kind of sex 
work.  
A more insidious interpretation of this raid is that it stood in reckless disregard 
of these women’s choices altogether. The interactions of the authorities with the 
women who were voluntarily present in the brothel represent more than an 
overblown abolitionist effort to protect these women. It was in fact an intentional 
effort to ignore their wishes. In effect, the choices of these women whose volitional 
engagement in sex work was known, constrained as they were by the situations that 
motivated them to migrate for sex work, warranted less respect than the abuses of 
the purported minors who were also present. The innocent/complicit dichotomy 
focuses on the abridgment of the autonomy of the innocent by coercing her into 
sexual labor. Yet this focus simultaneously creates a necessary condition of 
negating the choices of women who voluntarily make sexual labor their living. It 
names women victims when they may not choose this label for themselves.139 
When women resist the label of victim, this discourse of innocence and complicity 
disregards them altogether.  
Other theorists within the sex-worker-rights movement take this argument a step 
further than merely an effort to respect the choices of women who do sex work, and 
begin to identify the ways in which this kind of work offers liberation to the women 
who do it. The argument, however, differs significantly from the sex-radical 
understanding of the liberatory nature of sexual labor,140 which focuses on sex 
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. This dichotomy pervades feminist analyses of sex-related oppression. When a 
woman asks a rapist to use a condom, or even uses birth control at all, her contemplation of 
the possibility of sexual contact is sufficient for her to be treated as culpable for the 
occurrence of the contact, even when she has explicitly not consented to the contact itself. 
See generally Carla M. da Luz & Pamela C. Weckerly, Recent Development, The Texas 
‘Condom-Rape’ Case: Caution Construed as Consent, 3 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 95 (1993); 
Donna J. Case, Comment, Condom or Not, Rape is Rape: Rape Law in the Era of AIDS—
Does Condom Use Constitute Consent?, 19 DAYTON L. REV. 227 (1993). 
 138. See supra notes 1–29 and accompanying text. 
 139. See Nicola Gavey, “I Wasn’t Raped, but . . .”: Revisiting Definitional Problems in 
Sexual Victimization, in NEW VERSIONS OF VICTIMS: FEMINISTS STRUGGLE WITH THE 
CONCEPT 57, 67 (Sharon Lamb ed., 1999) (discussing the problems with victim identification 
and self-identification in the context of questions of narrative, rape, consent, and power). 
 140. Carol Queen, Sex Radical Politics, Sex-Positive Feminist Thought, and Whore 
Stigma, in WHORES AND OTHER FEMINISTS, supra note 93, at 125, 127. 
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workers’ subversive use of sexual power in a patriarchal society.141 Whereas some 
migrant sex workers conceive of the possibility of sexual liberation through their 
work, of greater interest to this analysis is the possibility of liberation from other 
forms of oppression for migrant sex workers. Gail Pheterson, for example, 
recognizes that for many women, particularly those in developing states, their lives 
are often lived in situations of both gendered and economic oppression from which 
they seek liberation.142  
Yet for such women, these kinds of oppression do not merely function as social 
problems, but as a political, class-based violation of women’s human rights 
intended to maintain women in a position of political subjugation.143 In cases where 
this is an accurate description of women’s condition, Pheterson argues that 
migration can serve as a resistance strategy to the gendered oppression that women 
experience in their daily lives.144 I would expand this analysis to include the 
oppression that women experience on the basis of race or indigeneity, which again 
can be pervasive elements in the narrative of women’s oppression in societies 
worldwide.  
This description applies, for example, in the case of the Shan women depicted at 
the beginning of this Article. In the situations of the women described in that 
narrative, the government targets them in a gendered manner by oppressing them 
through sexual abuse, but does so because of their membership in the indigenous, 
ethnic Shan group. For these women, to remove themselves from the state that 
perpetrates such harms to a state where they have more control over their daily 
existence is a resistance strategy. It marks a form of struggle against the economic 
oppression that coexists with ethnic and racial domination, by demonstrating 
economic capacity outside the limitations imposed by a brutal military regime.145 
Yet while this resistance strategy may appear subversive, it is more in line with a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. An entire literature and a set of strip clubs have grown up around the possibility of 
sexual performance as liberation or resistance. Annie Sprinkle is one sexual performance 
artist whose work is often noted. See, e.g., Linda Williams, A Provoking Agent: The 
Pornography and Performance Art of Annie Sprinkle, 37 SOC. TEXT 117 (1993). The Lusty 
Lady, a unionized strip club in San Francisco, remains another locale where sexual 
performance liberation is discussed in the context of workers’ rights. Glen Martin, S.F. Strip 
Club Ratifies Union—First in U.S., S.F. CHRON., Apr. 11, 1997, at A19. Finally, the rise of 
competitive pole dancing indicates how notions of liberating, and even athletic, sexual 
performance have gone mainstream. See USPDF Championship 2011 Ticket Sales, U.S. 
POLE DANCING FEDERATION, http://uspoledance.com/Video_uspdfChampionship.php. 
 142. PHETERSON, supra note 113, at 101–02. 
 143. See id. at 102. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. In this regard, the commercialization of sex can be described as what 
Kathryn Abrams calls resistant self-direction, which is typified by women’s efforts “simply 
to pursue their own choices and plans in contexts where doing so evokes serious gender-
based challenge.” Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on 
Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 832 (1999). Resistant self-direction, according 
to Abrams, is not always explicit and thus sometimes is not recognized as resistance, despite 
women’s efforts to “negotiate gender-based obstacles in order to achieve their larger goals.” 
Id. at 833. For a helpful discussion of resistance strategies and their role in avoiding 
essentialism, see also Harris, supra note 84, at 612.  
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traditional, liberal model of encountering and overcoming oppression. Here, 
trafficked women simply seek equality—equality of access to migration channels, 
equality of employment opportunity, equality of admission to a nondomestic 
economy—as freedom from the economic insecurity that plagues subsistence 
farming households worldwide.146 Trafficked women who choose to be trafficked 
are coping by accessing a type of practical equality of opportunity, which is a 
traditionally liberal goal. Migrant sex workers do not seek to exert their sexuality 
subversively through performance in response to oppression. Rather, they sell it 
because it is the one commodity they possess that will fetch a price, and in earning 
that wage, they subvert a system that denies them economic privilege.147  
B. The Weaknesses of Feminist Sex-Work-Rights Advocacy  
in the Realm of Trafficking 
While these positions on sex work and trafficking offer the possibility of 
reconceptualizing sex work and the status of sex workers, they are also fraught with 
problems. One glaring issue, particularly in the writings of some first-world liberal 
feminists such as Martha Nussbaum, is the pervasive assertion that sexual labor is 
just another kind of work. Beginning with the premise that all forms of work 
require the sale of some use of the body, Nussbaum, for example, offers an 
explanation of how sexual labor is similar to and differs from other kinds of 
work.148 She compares sex work to other kinds of labor, including as examples the 
jobs of a factory worker at a poultry processing plant, a philosophy professor, and a 
masseuse, among others.149 She engages in this exercise in an effort to undermine 
some of the stigma attached to sexual labor, trying to show that other lines of work, 
like sex work, have both positive and negative attributes. Nussbaum’s ultimate 
goal, however, is to demonstrate that the widespread stigmatization of sex work as 
an undignified line of work is an irrational attachment to a puritanical notion of sex.  
Nussbaum is correct to identify the ways that sex work has been the subject of 
stigma and that the cost of stigmatization has been levied on the women who do the 
work.150 Basic worker rights, as Nussbaum accurately suggests, would provide 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. See Kempadoo, supra note 111, at 3–4 (discussing the income generation that leads 
third-world women to perform sex work). 
 147. It is not uncommon for women to feel a great sense of pride in their own self-
sufficiency in generating income for perhaps the first time. Lilya 4-Ever is a film that 
documents a sex worker’s sense of accomplishment in her own earning power. In this 
fictional film about the trafficking of a young woman, Lilya, from a former Soviet republic 
to Sweden, one observes the shame of the protagonist when she enters the local convenience 
store and lacks the money to purchase the few groceries she had selected. After selling sex 
for the first time out of economic desperation and retching with revulsion at the act, Lilya 
enters the same store, fills a basket with groceries, and grins when paying in large bills. 
LILYA 4-EVER (Memfis Film 2002). 
 148. NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 276, 280–85.  
 149. For a more detailed description of the specifics of this example, see supra note 92.  
 150. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 285–86. Jody Freeman, while critical of liberal 
feminists’ treatment of sex work, likewise argues that in Canada, where prostitution is legal 
but all surrounding activity is illegal, “[t]he threat of prosecution and the stigma attached to 
prostitution undoubtedly make it difficult for prostitutes to organize and impossible for them 
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substantial improvement in the lot of sex workers.151 Yet without waxing in the 
direction of dominance feminist theory on the violence and oppression that are 
endemic to prostitution, it is reasonable to say that prostitution, as it currently 
exists, is an unusually dangerous profession for most women who engage in it. 
Even ensuring basic workers’ rights for sex workers—say, through wage and hour 
laws and workplace safety measures—still cannot inoculate sex work from its 
inherent dangers as compared to other kinds of work. Improvements might be 
made, but the risk endemic to sex work will remain.  
Understanding the potential dangers of sex work does not require a complex 
thought experiment. Ten years ago, it was common for Nigerian women who had 
been trafficked to Italy to wait along the sides of roads winding between towns in 
Tuscany and Umbria in order to sell sex to passersby.152 These women would ride 
the interurban bus to their appointed hairpin turn in the morning, wait throughout 
the day seated on a folding chair for their clients to stop in their cars, and then, as 
the last bus of the afternoon arrived, hide their folding chair in the underbrush in a 
hurry to catch the last ride home. If these women had been selling sodas or 
sandwiches along the roads between hill towns, they would not have encountered 
the same level of threat. Performing work that requires the laborer to strip naked 
and render herself vulnerable to her customers simply involves a higher level of 
risk than fully clothed employment options.153 Regulation cannot resolve all of the 
dangers of sex work, though it can improve working conditions in some 
circumstances. 
Certainly, there are more dangerous lines of work, some of which threaten 
similar kinds of risks as those specific to sex work. Yet sex work, particularly the 
migrant sex work that is at issue in most trafficking situations, is the instance of the 
intersection of multiple forms of oppression with the real possibility of serious 
harm for the women who engage in it. Some sex workers assert that sex work is a 
liberatory way to reclaim sexual agency for women, and some women who make 
these claims are migrant sex workers from developing countries.154 But most 
women who are publicly engaged in this kind of sex-radical effort in the sex-
worker-rights movement are from developed contexts;155 economic necessity may 
                                                                                                                 
to seek the protection of the police when they are victims of crime.” Freeman, supra note 99, 
at 82. 
 151. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 298. 
 152. This observation is based upon my time living in Arezzo, Italy, during August and 
September of 2000. 
 153. These risks of physical danger are real. Melissa Farley, Prostitution, Trafficking, 
and Cultural Amnesia: What We Must Not Know in Order to Keep the Business of Sexual 
Exploitation Running Smoothly, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 109, 111 (2006) (identifying sex 
workers as vulnerable to “intimate partner violence by customers as well as pimps” and 
asserting that “[p]imps and customers use methods of coercion and control like those of 
other batterers: economic exploitation, social isolation, verbal abuse, threats, physical 
violence, sexual assault, captivity, minimization and denial of their use of physical violence 
and abuse”).  
 154. Cf. supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 155. The sex-worker-activist-scholars who contributed to Jill Nagle’s exemplary 1997 
book Whores and Other Feminists, supra note 93, are primarily first-world women writing 
about their experiences in sex work and the liberating effects of such labor. While Annie 
Sprinkle’s revolutionary work on de-stigmatizing sexual labor is important to the first-world 
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have motivated their entry into sex work, but the kind of complex migration issues 
that underscore trafficking are not usually implicated.  
A more fundamental critique is often leveled at liberal feminists, arising from 
the long-standing debate around the intersection of feminism and classical 
liberalism. Some, perhaps many, feminist scholars support the claim that no liberal 
position can be feminist because it would not reflect the constraints of social 
influence and structure.156 Because liberals view the individual as the actor of 
concern, liberalism is often criticized for its failure to contextualize the individual 
in society.157 Inherent in this critique of liberal feminism is the concept that a 
feminist position is one that offers a society-based critique of the operation of 
gender relations, rather than one born from in the rights of an individual.158 Even 
archetypal feminist liberal thinkers like Martha Nussbaum have addressed this 
issue, with an effort to frame much of their writing from an internationalist, 
humanist perspective that is concerned with the social shaping of preference and 
                                                                                                                 
sex-worker rights movement, it is not necessarily an accurate description of the experiences 
of all women in the sexual services industry who seek radical change to their profession. 
Whereas sex-worker rights movements of the global North leverage sexually ironic or 
gender-role subversive performance in commentary on social norms and constraints, third-
world sex-worker movements tend toward more populist kinds of interventions. In the sense 
that these women assert their choice to engage in sex work, and request respect as 
professionals, it parallels the North American and European sex-radical movements. But 
unlike these movements, third-world sex workers tend not to emphasize the performative, 
sexually subversive elements of the work. Rather, they look more like factory workers 
attempting to organize for labor rights. The most radical sex-worker movements in 
developing contexts seek unionization, labor rights, education, credit facilities, vocational 
training, and health care. The difference then is not merely of degree but of kind; for 
radicalized third-world sex workers, commodified sexual activity is much more about 
economic than sexual liberation. For detailed, firsthand accounts of third-world organizing 
efforts and the kinds of collective actions workers take, see, for example, Angelita Abad, 
Marena Briones, Tatiana Cordero, Rosa Manzo & Marta Marchán, The Association of 
Autonomous Women Workers, Ecuador: “22nd June,” in GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, 
RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION, supra note 37, at 172 (discussing organizing in Ecuador); 
Claudia Colimoro, A World of People: Sex Workers in Mexico, in GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: 
RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION, supra note 37, at 197–99 (interviewed by Amalia 
Lucia Cabezas) (discussing organizing in Mexico); Shane A. Petzer & Gordon M. Issacs, 
SWEAT: The Development and Implementation of a Sex Worker Advocacy and Intervention 
Program in Post-Apartheid South Africa (with Special Reference to the Western City of 
Cape Town), in GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION, supra note 
37, at 192 (discussing organizing in South Africa).  
 156. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 99, at 75 n.2, 89. 
 157. Id. at 87 (“Feminist theory and critical legal studies have attempted to expose the 
inability of liberal theory to account for our connections to others, or our ‘social 
constitutiveness.’ The central features of liberalism—the public/private distinction, a highly 
individualistic conception of rights—are commonly attacked as inappropriate for, and 
unresponsive to, feminist demands for equality and freedom.”). 
 158. Indeed, some feminist scholars working in the liberal tradition posit that patriarchal 
bias is inherent in liberal political theory and describe liberal feminism as, at best, an 
oxymoron. See, e.g., ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM 5–9 
(1981) (developing the concept of liberal feminism as problematic and potentially 
contradictory). 
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desire as well as with sympathetic understanding.159 This answer is helpful insofar 
as it addresses the most egregious shortcomings of traditional liberal theory; 
Nussbaum holds herself to a rigorous model of the liberal individual as engaged in 
society, and, thus, she escapes some of the most common critiques of liberalism.160  
But the problem remains that the individual functions as the primary subject of 
liberal feminist inquiry, and society-wide or class concerns are relevant for their 
impact on the individual. Social factors may cause some of the problems that the 
individual woman encounters, but liberal feminist theorizing engages society 
through the individual, not from an independent social critique. Because of this, 
liberal feminism, even when Nussbaum stretches it skillfully, cannot offer a cogent, 
self-sufficient theory of social oppression of women as a class, even a 
nonmonolithic one. 
Sex-worker-rights advocates, including Doezema and Kempadoo, are not 
subject to the same kind of criticism of the basis of their feminist self-
identification. In part, this seems to be because activist-scholars like these address 
trafficking from a position of claiming the rights of individual sex workers rather 
than offering a more sweeping theory of the feminist significance of prostitution, as 
Nussbaum articulates. Another factor that inoculates such work from the critiques 
that traditional liberal feminist scholars encounter is the centering of individual 
experience in the theoretical project.161  
The centrality of coercion to liberal feminist thought on trafficking is also 
potentially problematic. At times, the discussion of coercion tends toward a narrow, 
legalistic definition of the concept. Reliance on a strict form of coercion as the 
dispositive element of a case of trafficking is problematic, although this is precisely 
the codified vision of what sex trafficking is: sex work under coercion. Consent, as 
defined in the Trafficking Protocol, is insufficient to override the coercion that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. NUSSBAUM, supra note 88, at 6.  
 160. Unlike historical liberal political philosophers, Nussbaum envisions a liberal 
individual who exists in community and society, not in atomistic isolation. See id. at 10–11.  
 161. To appreciate the ways in which the experiences of individuals can be centered in 
broader considerations of trafficking, see generally GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, 
RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION, supra note 37. But what to call this generation of sex-
worker-rights advocates is a puzzle. The epistemological claim that the lives of women 
generate the fodder for theoretical development is closely associated with the 
poststructuralist movement. See Harris, supra note 84, at 585. Yet, although this group of 
activist-scholars offers a theory of trafficking with greater attention to the role of social 
systems in the life of the individual sex worker than a traditional liberal feminist, the 
individual as a constituent member of a social class remains the central element of the 
theory. Furthermore, the sex-worker-advocate orientation envisions an individual who is 
influenced by social pressures but ultimately acts as a unitary agent, even while engaging in 
the kind of social-movement work that these authors espouse. At the foundational level, both 
traditional liberals and contemporary sex-worker-rights advocates focus on the rights of the 
individual migrant sex worker, as animated by the choices of the individual. Most 
importantly, the individual’s experience of coercion, whether at the hand of a trafficker or 
under the influence of an oppressive society, shapes the contours of each theory. So although 
the theories differ in key ways, they are rooted in a similar understanding of the sex worker 
as an individual agent of her own life, who acts within society in furtherance of her own, 
self-defined goals. This conception of the individual ultimately has some liberal origins.  
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defines a trafficking case.162 Yet the vision of coercion contained in the 
international definition is perhaps too weak of an understanding of coercive force in 
the lives of women who experience domination on the basis of sex, race, third-
world disadvantage, indigeneity, or some combination thereof.  
Martha Nussbaum’s vision of coercion163 is worth repeating here. Although a 
traditional liberal model of coercion would require some kind of explicit force or 
fraud, a more nuanced, feminist understanding of coercion acknowledges the 
coercive force of societal oppression. This is consistent with Nussbaum’s 
intentional rejection of the atomistic vision of the individual and her appreciation 
for the context in which the individual lives;164 it is also represented in the thought 
of Doezema, Kempadoo, and their contemporaries, who all reject a vision of 
women’s choices as occurring in a vacuum.165 While this mode of thought accounts 
for the social nature of coercion, none of these theorists believe it worthwhile to 
undermine an individual woman’s agency in order to protect her from systemic, 
categorical oppression.  
However, the entire concept of coercion, even where broadened to allow for the 
impact of diffuse social pressures, is still predicated on the impact of coercive 
pressure on the individual. A focus on coercion requires a close examination of 
individual choices, which implicates society as a corollary matter. Yet coercion, as 
envisioned by the theorists here discussed, is defined by its impact on individuals, 
not by its social nature. One can imagine ubiquitous, subtle, and hidden results of 
social oppression that pressure individuals in a coercive manner, but that are not 
identified as coercion either because no specific persons are aware of the 
experience of coercion or because the coercion is such a pervasive element within 
society that it evades observation. So whereas liberal feminists leave theoretical 
space for this kind of “soft,” social-pressure coercion, in some cases, it would seem 
to escape their notice, as they rely on the individual as the touchstone of assessing 
coercion.166 Sex-worker-rights advocates similarly look at individual experience as 
the ruler for measuring coercion.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 162. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 3(b).  
 163. See generally supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
 164. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 88, at 10–11.  
 165. See, e.g., Kamala Kempadoo, Introduction: Globalizing Sex Workers’ Rights, in 
GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION, supra note 37, at 17–19. 
 166. Susan Moller Okin has offered a careful and nuanced assessment of how feminist 
theory can account for this kind of soft, diffuse coercion without resorting to a strict notion 
of false consciousness. Susan Moller Okin, Reply, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR 
WOMEN? 117, 126 (Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1999). 
Okin discusses the observation that women sometimes express preferences for antifeminist, 
subordinating social choices, which she terms adaptive preferences, by noting that “[o]ne 
need not rely on the Marxist theory of false consciousness to recognize that persons 
subjected to unjust conditions often adapt their preferences so as to conceal the injustice of 
their situation from themselves.” Id. She continues by considering that older women in a 
patriarchal culture tend not to want change because it is difficult to question cultural 
constraints and because their roles might depend on successful enculturation of younger 
people, particularly daughters-in-law, to performance of traditional, patriarchal social roles. 
Id.  
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Leaving theoretical space for the soft coercion of social forces still does not 
bring these generally liberal theorists to a systematic understanding of the 
oppression that trafficked women experience as a class. Foregrounding coercion 
requires explicit focus on the individual, as well as the theoretical construction of 
society-wide oppression as the sum of individual experiences, not as a pervasive 
element of a society itself. Thus, while a collection of individual experiences can 
generate a societal conceptualization of oppression as the source of coercion, it 
does not necessarily do so. A broad-based critique of the limits of sexist society can 
result from the liberal identification of coercion, but it does not automatically 
follow from a liberal notion of coercion; the liberal theory of the individual may 
actually make it harder to identify patterns of coercion within groups of individuals. 
Because of this attachment to the individual as the basis of liberal theory and the 
possibility that coercion will not be subject to collective analysis, liberal feminist 
thought on trafficking often lacks the kind of expansive social critique that seeks to 
explain the occurrence of trafficking and the possibilities for its eradication.  
III. HARMONIZING FEMINIST APPROACHES TO TRAFFICKING: THIRD-WAY FEMINISM 
In the context of trafficking for sexual purposes, political pragmatism and 
feminist commitment to social change that improves the lot of women demand 
efforts to bring opposing organizations into dialogue. While liberal and dominance 
feminists engage in a public policy death match for theoretical primacy, women 
trafficked for sexual purposes continue to face the tangible harms that purportedly 
concern these feminists. Even for those who expressly reject feminism but are 
concerned with human suffering in general, this ideological conflict poses a 
problem, insofar as it exhausts valuable energy that might be invested in aiding 
people in need.167 The kinds of situations described in the introduction, in which 
activists, governments, and social-service providers subjugate the needs of 
particular trafficked women in the pursuit of ideological warfare in the public-
policy realm, have proven inconsistent with ardent advocacy for trafficked women 
that focuses on concrete interventions. How we have thought about trafficking for 
sexual purposes has inhibited what we have been able to do about it.168 The 
following proposed harmonization of these two theories thus serves the pragmatic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 167. To the extent that this conflict over the meaning of sex work distracts from more 
constructive, pragmatic discourse on trafficking into all labor sectors, resolving this problem 
pays dividends when trying to generate cogent public policy interventions in situations of 
trafficking for other forms of labor as well. Chang & Kim, supra note 15, at 318–19 (noting 
the U.S. government’s focus on sex trafficking and ongoing ignorance of “trafficking into 
agriculture, domestic service, restaurants, hotels, manufacturing, and construction” and 
observing that the “emphasis on criminal enforcement and antiprostitution policies curtails 
the rights of trafficked persons voluntarily engaged as sex workers, and marginalizes 
trafficked persons in non-sex related industries”).  
 168. See, e.g., Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel: 
Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural Failures to Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 337, 351 (2007) (observing the U.S. response to 
trafficking by noting that if the government insists on rescuing girls chained to beds in 
brothels, it will overlook the vast majority of trafficked persons in the country).  
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goal of implementing effective public policies that might obviate the need for 
continued infighting in the anti-trafficking community. A third way between these 
two feminist accounts of trafficking seeks to harness the analytical strengths of 
each in order to avoid the perils of the other. Finally, while the foregoing 
descriptions are offered in theoretical terms, this harmonized account of a feminist 
theory of trafficking for sexual purposes resonates with specific, practical public-
policy interventions because it is a practical, rather than normative, project.  
A. Third-Way Feminism: A Practical Middle Ground 
There are shortcomings to both major theoretical approaches to the trafficking of 
women for sexual purposes. As described above, dominance feminism mutes the 
voices of sex workers who would offer an alternative vision of their sexual labor. 
Through its monolithic conflation of voluntary and involuntary sex work and its 
refusal to consider the dissenting views of individual women, it obliterates the 
possibility of sexual labor serving any kind of liberatory purpose in the lives of 
women.169 On the other hand, because of the liberal conception of the individual as 
the subject of questions of political philosophy, liberal feminists cannot offer a rich 
account of the societal structures and pressures that shape women’s experience in 
the public labor market. This shortcoming has its most critical expression in the 
excessive liberal dependence on an individually determined vision of coercion, 
which relies narrowly on the experiences of individual women rather than offering 
a more visionary critique of the systematized nature of the oppression of women 
along axes of gender, race, and indigeneity.  
Yet both major strains of theory offer significant and powerful contributions to a 
complete understanding of trafficking for sexual purposes. Kathleen Barry’s 
dominance feminist model portrays the depth of sex-based domination that is at the 
root of the trafficking of women for sexual purposes; she offers a scathing critique 
of a world that relegates many women to a life-long position of oppression, with 
sexual labor as one of few economically viable fields of work.170 Her theory 
expresses a deep understanding of the similarity of the lives of many women and of 
how these experiences are part of their class-based condition. At the other extreme, 
the liberal attachment to the individual allows room for the ambiguity and 
complexity of individual women’s experiences; it does not force the discrete voices 
of particular women to conform to a monolithic theory of what trafficking for 
sexual purposes means from a feminist perspective. Furthermore, the 
poststructuralist conception of the individual allows greater appreciation of the 
ways in which different women experience oppression along distinct axes. 
Together, liberal and poststructuralist feminisms allow room for women to name 
and define their own oppression, and to suggest what kinds of solutions they need 
to solve the problems they perceive in their own lives.171  
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. Kamala Kempadoo, Women of Color and the Global Sex Trade: Transnational 
Perspectives, MERIDIANS, Spring 2001, at 28, 28.  
 170. See supra notes 37–73 and accompanying text. 
 171. Sex workers themselves have identified space between victimhood and agency in 
which they live and work. Travis S.K. Kong, What It Feels Like for a Whore: The Body 
Politics of Women Performing Erotic Labour in Hong Kong, 13 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 409 
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A middle way between these two opposing theoretical positions must embrace 
the strengths of both models, using each theory to bolster the other in substantive 
ways. If reconciled, the liberal appreciation for individual experience and the 
poststructuralist awareness of the need for individualized intervention can resolve 
the flaws of dominance feminism’s universalized account. Similarly, reconciling 
aspects of liberalism and dominance theory permits the use of the class-based 
analysis of dominance feminism to overcome the liberal failure to provide a cogent 
description of the social nature of the oppressions that cause trafficking. Such 
complementary work has been performed, but primarily at a theoretical level, in the 
current dialogue around the issue of partial agency within the law, which hints at 
what a concretized version of the theory might resemble in the context of legal and 
policy reform.172  
Yet the third-way feminist approach that I advocate differs from the existing 
theories in important ways. First, it is context specific. Whereas scholars such as 
Kathryn Abrams develop a multipurpose account of women’s agency that can be 
imported into discussions of feminist legal theory as applied to any substantive area 
of law,173 the present model, as offered here, is specific to the issue of trafficking 
for sexual purposes. Second, the instant account finds normative mandate in the 
widespread ideological conflict that creates chaos of concrete trafficking 
interventions. Thus, its impetus resides outside the realm of theory and squarely 
inside that of public policy and law. Although it describes in great detail the 
generative theoretical accounts of trafficking that underlie present political 
positions, here the theory serves to clarify the normative positions underlying 
particular forms of policy advocacy; this project, at its essence, is pragmatic and 
seeks ideological unity among bickering organizations. Abrams, in contrast, finds 
epistemological origins in theory, from which she generates policy.174 Both are 
endeavors of feminist legal theory; yet, as they take their cues from different 
sources, they conclude in different places. Abrams’s project provides a thorough 
but generalist approach for feminist law and policy making;175 the task of this 
Article is to frame a theoretical model of trafficking for sexual purposes that is 
generative of interventions acceptable to all feminists. In short, this project takes up 
Abrams’s suggestion to “address[ ] particular controversies as they arise.”176  
                                                                                                                 
(2006) (documenting this complexity through a series of in-depth individual interviews with 
sex workers in Hong Kong).  
 172. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal 
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 351–53 (1995) (discussing partial agency from the 
standpoint of analyzing the nature of the legal subject). While the first step in such a project 
is defining the nature of the subject, Abrams delineates a clear space for carrying such 
theoretical discussions into the realm of concrete controversies. See infra note 176 and 
accompanying text. 
 173. Abrams, supra note 172, at 355 (“I will classify these approaches by the type of 
strategy they involve—the particular use that they propose to make of legal rules and/or 
imagery—rather than by the area(s) of substantive law to which they apply.”). 
 174. See generally id. at 351–76. 
 175. See id. at 355. 
 176. Id. (“[T]he agency critique would seem to point toward a strategic or pragmatic 
approach that addresses particular controversies as they arise, in light of more generally 
shared goals.” (internal citation omitted)).  
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B. Third-Way Feminism’s Four Central Tenets 
With regard to the trafficking of women for sexual purposes and migration for 
sexual labor, four central tenets serve to describe in broad strokes a feminist third 
way. First, the theoretical harmonization of dominance and liberal feminism in the 
context of the trafficking of women and migration for sexual labor would adopt the 
dominance feminist cognizance of the system of oppression in which individual 
women make choices. Particularly in the case of international migration for sexual 
labor, the reality is that many women encounter intersecting oppressions on a daily 
basis; racism, sexism, discrimination on the basis of indigenous status, classism, 
and myriad other forms of oppression are part of life for women worldwide and 
pervade women’s conceptualization of their life choices. In a third-way theory, 
prioritizing an overarching awareness of the systematic nature of how privilege 
structures opportunity is a tribute to dominance feminism’s effort to describe a 
world of sexualized domination. Indeed, the key contribution of dominance 
feminism to this third-way model of trafficking is its profound sociological insight 
into the structural aspects of gender and power, which cannot be fully understood 
by looking at individuals, but rather requires a broad, even globalizing, analysis. 
Interventions that forward this tenet happen society-wide, likely in institutional 
spheres, and seek to systematically deconstruct laws supportive of continued 
oppressive circumstances.  
Second, a harmonized feminism attempts to explain and counteract the impact 
of multiple forms of oppression on the lives of women. This theory of oppression 
draws on the strength of dominance feminism in perceiving oppressions from a 
social, rather than individual, perspective. Yet where dominance feminism breaks 
down due to its universalizing that refuses to accept the multiplicity of oppressions 
that shape women’s lives, the poststructuralist model of intersecting oppressions 
presents an alternative method of comprehending oppressions as uniquely 
experienced by individuals. The third-way theory of trafficking for sexual purposes 
accounts for the class-based nature of these oppressions. Barry’s influence is felt by 
acknowledging that women as a group can be partially understood through an 
explanation of oppression. Yet this third-way project also reflects the 
poststructuralist awareness that because not all women experience each axis of 
oppression, individuals’ needs and responses will differ. Interventions consistent 
with this tenet offer women trafficked for sexual purposes opportunities, 
information, and resources to overcome the power differentials inherent in these 
intersecting oppressions, while refusing to mandate a monolithic, one-size-fits-all 
intervention. 
Third, a harmonized feminist account of trafficking does not subsume the 
particularized experiences of individual women in the social explanation of the 
nature of oppression. Space remains within this description of a shared, class-based 
status for women to opt out. This tenet arises from the liberal feminist respect for 
an individual’s ability to narrate her own story on her own terms. Interventions that 
embrace this aspect of a third-way discourse on trafficking for sexual purposes 
provide individual women opportunities to name the sources of their own 
oppression, rather than defining the trafficking experience for them, and also to 
coordinate anti-oppression efforts with others who self-identify as similarly 
situated.  
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Fourth, the harmonized feminist account of trafficking leaves open the 
possibility of agentic177 action, even under oppression. Multiple oppressions are not 
the sole defining characteristics of women’s existence under a third-way model of 
trafficking for sexual purposes. Oppressions occur socially, and can be opposed 
both socially and individually; the choice of how to oppose oppression remains 
with individual women. This element of the project acknowledges that oppression’s 
impact is far reaching, but strongly asserts women’s ability to stand in opposition to 
oppression. This tenet of third-way feminist theory focuses on the need to 
affirmatively increase women’s options for agentic action. Merely allowing space 
for independent agentic action is insufficient; interventions that advance agentic 
action leverage law and public policy to create legal channels in which women can 
act on their own behalf.  
C. Third-Way Feminist Sociolegal Interventions 
These harmonized elements also point in the direction of the kind of sociolegal 
interventions that best serve trafficked persons, while simultaneously avoiding each 
theory’s primary pitfalls.  
First, at least portions of both sides of the abolition/sex-worker-rights debate 
advocate the decriminalization of prostitution,178 specifically by removing 
engagement in sexual labor from the criminal code.179 This proposition alone would 
                                                                                                                 
 
 177. This use of the term “agentic” invokes Amartya Sen’s use of the term “agent”  
in its older—and “grander”—sense as someone who acts and brings about 
change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and 
objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as 
well. This [theory] is particularly concerned with the agency role of the 
individual as a member of the public and as a participant in economic, social 
and political actions . . . . 
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 19 (1999). For example, in discussing the actions 
of women in demanding wartime government accountability, Kathryn Abrams has written 
that “women are playing an agentic part in managing the culturally-constructed 
contradictions of their role. They are negotiating the balance between the gendered and the 
gender-neutral in interesting and creative ways.” Kathryn Abrams, Lecture, Women and 
Antiwar Protest: Rearticulating Gender and Citizenship, 87 B.U. L. REV. 849, 881 (2007).  
 178. Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir, and Chantal Thomas describe four 
ways in which the legal system can deal with sex work. Halley et al., supra note 24, at 338–
39. Complete criminalization criminalizes both the sale and purchase of sex. Id. Partial 
decriminalization decriminalizes the actions of sex workers, but criminalizes the actions of 
johns. Id. Complete decriminalization removes all criminal penalties from engagement in sex 
work, though other kinds of criminal liability may attach to actions taken during the sale or 
purchase of sex. Id. Finally, legalization involves complete decriminalization plus regulation 
of sex work. Id. 
 179. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Prostitution and Civil Rights, in WOMEN’S LIVES, 
MEN’S LAWS, supra note 36, at 151, 155 (“Criminal laws against prostitution make women 
into criminals for being victimized as women, yet there are no cases challenging these laws 
as sex discrimination on this ground. Criminal prostitution laws collaborate elaborately in 
women’s social inequality; through them, the state enforces the exploitation of prostituted 
women directly.” (internal citation omitted)); NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 296 (“Certainly 
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make serious progress in both shifting the stigma of sex work, a priority of liberal 
theorists, and reducing the likelihood of women’s victimization at the hands of 
police operating within a system of sexualized dominance. Consistent with the four 
tenets of third-way theory, decriminalization acknowledges the system of 
oppression in which trafficked women live and reframes these women, at least in 
part, either as victims of the crimes of traffickers or, in the alternative, as 
individuals capable of asserting their own agentic choices. Decriminalization thus 
offers the possibility of the neutrality of the law in its encounter with trafficked 
women, rejecting a universal definition of the trafficked sex worker as criminal and 
instead providing the opportunity for self-definition on the spectrum of agency and 
victimhood. 
Reform of police investigation and prosecution offers a more moderate and 
perhaps more attainable third-way intervention, which similarly leverages change 
to the perceived criminality of trafficking-related sex-work offenses.180 This kind of 
restructuring is much more widespread in practice than the kind of 
decriminalization typically advocated in the literature, and, similarly, attempts to 
protect individual trafficked women from specific harms at the hands of police and 
prosecutors that follow from the stigma of sex work. Yet, unlike full-fledged 
decriminalization, more moderate interventions do not pose the problem of 
offending local mores and social norms regarding sex work in the same way that 
complete decriminalization does.181 Either decriminalization or reform is consistent 
with third-way feminist values, but reform might be preferable for pragmatic 
reasons.  
Reforms of this kind can be found when police officers and agencies opt to work 
outside formal legal structures to help social-service providers work with trafficked 
                                                                                                                 
[the economic situation of women] will not be ameliorated by the criminalization of 
prostitution, which reduces poor women’s options still further.”). But see Janice G. 
Raymond, Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution and a Legal Response to the Demand 
for Prostitution, 2 J. OF TRAUMA PRAC. 315, 316 (2003) (arguing against the legalization of 
sex work because it would legitimate “prostitution as work [and make] the harm of 
prostitution to women invisible, expand[] the sex industry, and [fail to] empower the women 
in prostitution”).  
 180. This vision of intervention in trafficking in the criminal sphere reflects both the 
trend toward governance feminism, critically described as the “infiltration of specifically 
feminist activism into generalist forms of power-wielding,” Halley et al., supra note 24, at 
343 (emphasis omitted), as well as the current pushback by feminists who challenge the co-
optation of feminist power by the police state, Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on 
Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 653 (2009) (leveling this critique in the arena of rape laws). 
The rejection of the absolute reliance on police power to create change is one of the 
emerging neofeminist principles. Gruber et al., supra note 31.  
 181. Where efforts to decriminalize prostitution have occurred in the United States, they 
have been opposed in many instances. See, e.g., John M. Glionna, Proposition to Protect Sex 
Work Splits S.F.: Backers Say Measure Would Help Public Health, Foes Contend It Will 
Attract Criminals, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A2 (quoting Kamala Harris, San Francisco 
District Attorney, on the topic of a decriminalization proposition, stating that “Prostitution is 
not a victimless crime. . . . It’s a crime that victimizes neighborhoods and plagues 
communities and compromises the quality of life of the people who live in those 
neighborhoods. This measure would prohibit us from putting public resources into helping 
those residents. And that’s not acceptable in this community.”). 
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women. The interventions of a handful of officers in an Italian police force offer 
one example of this in practice.182 Without the knowledge of the majority of the 
department, a few officers assisted local service organizations with removing 
individual women from trafficking situations. This aid typically came in the form 
of falsified arrests or deportations. A few officers would coordinate efforts with 
social-service providers to stage false police confrontations with local trafficked 
women. Those who wanted to return home to their families in Nigeria would have 
deportations fabricated and would return voluntarily; those who wanted to stay in 
Italy, but feared reprisals from traffickers, could assert an Italian law that granted 
residency to those who testified against their traffickers, and then would use a 
falsified arrest as the impetus to move to a social-service center or convent at the 
opposite end of the country, away from the community where their identities were 
known. These women would be free from their contracts, in most cases, once 
“deported” or “arrested,” which was a self-serving response that divested madams 
and traffickers of any sense of responsibility for the trafficked woman once she 
encountered legal trouble.  
Such a solution to the intractable dilemma of how to get already-trafficked 
women out of their situations recognizes key shortcomings in the ability of the state 
to offer meaningful interventions for trafficked women; it thus operates cognizant 
of the social nature of trafficking and the societal obstacles that prevent women 
from leaving trafficking. The corruption of local officers and their collaboration 
with traffickers meant that universal access to state assistance in leaving trafficked 
sex work was an impossibility; crooked officers would simply tip off traffickers so 
they could remove their sex workers from the city in anticipation of police action. 
Further, implementation of this strategy highlighted the insufficiency of both 
national and international legal coordination in offering protection to women who 
would try voluntarily to leave trafficked sex work.  
Beyond the pragmatism of this intervention, it also is consistent with the tenets 
of a third-way consideration of trafficking. The police who helped trafficked 
women in this way acted in knowledge that systematized oppression based on 
gender, race, and national-origin privilege allowed corrupt police to take advantage 
of trafficked women. Without these police officers’ insight into the pervasive, 
structural aspects of gendered power, which derives in large part from dominance 
feminist thought, such an intervention would not be possible. They refused to see 
these women merely as individuals who had made bad choices and instead 
appreciated them as persons stuck in a system that offered them few exit strategies. 
The solution of falsified legal action offered a bypass around the institutional 
structure that magnified the impacts of these oppressions on the lives of individual 
women. Further, by allowing the individual women who were well-suited to this 
kind of intervention to decide for themselves if and how they wanted to leave the 
trafficking situation, the police embraced the agency of individuals to act on their 
own behalf. Most importantly, these police used institutional resources to equalize 
power differentials based in male and race privilege by offering women the 
opportunity to choose to get out. Yet the police did not universalize the experience 
                                                                                                                 
 
 182. This example was drawn from my own experience working in Italy in 2000–01. 
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of individual women, instead generating context-specific, individualized plans that 
could account for the particularity of a single woman’s experience.  
Second, the creation of viable alternatives to sex work also follows necessarily 
from a theory that requires offering possibilities for agentic action; entering a 
trafficking situation can only be seen as an agentic life choice for women when it is 
chosen from among other viable life options. Liberal scholars suggest possible 
programs for increasing sex workers’ alternatives. Martha Nussbaum has 
articulated four stages for addressing liberal concerns with prostitution: 
1) provision of education to prostitutes and their children to increase their life 
options; 2) provision of microcredit to women to increase their employment 
options; 3) creation of labor unions for women in low-income jobs to create the 
possibility of collective, agentic action; and 4) creation of groups to increase 
women’s connectedness to one another.183 These suggestions closely parallel the 
kinds of interventions that the activist-scholar group advocates for as well.184 
Nussbaum’s proposals approach a third-way model, except that she does not 
specify the relationship between her ideas and the social nature of gendered 
oppression.  
A third-way model might offer programmatic interventions similar to those of 
Nussbaum but develop them with a specific eye to undermining systemic social 
factors that render women susceptible to trafficking.185 These interventions take 
their lead from a sociological observation of the systematic nature of the pervasive 
lack of privilege among poor women of color in societies of the global South, 
owing in large part to dominance feminist insights on structural aspects of gender 
and power, but intervene in the lives of individuals in a fashion perhaps better 
understood as liberal. Put another way, this kind of intervention leverages 
dominance feminist social observations but enacts typically liberal solutions. The 
American Himalayan Foundation offers an example of how these interventions 
                                                                                                                 
 
 183. NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 296–97. 
 184. See supra note 155 (discussing organizing). Whether activist or scholar, that 
Nussbaum and Doezema alike advocate for collective action by sex workers indicates that 
women in situations of sex work might find strength in numbers. Simply stated, this kind of 
group action by women, sex workers or not, is a well-documented way to produce the kind 
of positive change in life circumstance that leads to improved social conditions. See, e.g., 
NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 15 (emphasizing the role of Indian women’s collective action in 
improving their socioeconomic conditions).  
 185. Janie Chuang has offered a meaningful discussion of the factors creating 
susceptibility to trafficking, observing that  
[t]he problem of trafficking begins not with the traffickers themselves, but with 
the conditions that caused their victims to migrate under circumstances 
rendering them vulnerable to exploitation. Human trafficking is but “an 
opportunistic response” to the tension between the economic necessity to 
migrate, on the one hand, and the politically motivated restrictions on 
migration, on the other. 
Janie Chuang, Beyond a Snapshot: Preventing Human Trafficking in the Global Economy, 
13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 137, 140 (2006). Chuang goes on to identify how migratory 
push-pull factors function in the trafficking arena. Id. at 140–47. Dina Francesca Haynes has 
made similar observations in her scholarship on trafficking. See Haynes, supra note 168, at 
353–55. 
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might be developed. One of their programs provides funds to keep Nepali girls in 
school during the years they are most vulnerable to being trafficked or to migrating 
to engage in sex work.186 It is an intervention that occurs at the level of the 
individual, but is crafted and shaped according to social reality. Further, it is a 
third-way feminist model because it explicitly acknowledges the intersecting 
systems of gender, race, and class that deny female children in Nepali villages 
access to education. It also views these systems with a forward-looking gaze, 
recognizing that educated girls will raise the standard of living for the community 
as a whole, and their families in particular, with the intent of solving the problem of 
trafficking in the future.187 Yet it encounters these oppressions with an eye to the 
empowerment of individual, specific girls, offering them viable future options of 
agentic adult action, through which they might, if they choose, avoid lives of 
commercial sex work. The American Himalayan Foundation takes seemingly 
liberal interventions but contextualizes them in a profound understanding of 
systematic social oppression, which they seek to overcome. Even more robust 
interventions could involve paying formerly trafficked women who have since 
graduated to be school teachers so they can earn a salary, or paying families some 
kind of stipend on top of the scholarship for their daughters to overcome the 
opportunity cost of having a girl in school instead of earning money for the 
family’s support. 
Third, any kind of direct intervention in a situation of sex work or trafficking 
must be done in dialogue with the women in question. Public policy that ignores 
the real needs of individual trafficked women does not show respect for the choices 
of individual women. Yet recently developed domestic public-policy options 
demonstrate how legal interventions can let individual trafficked persons shape 
how they will pursue their own paths once they have successfully left a trafficking 
situation. Advocates for trafficked persons successfully lobbied for the amendment 
of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act with the inclusion of a civil remedy 
provision in the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003.188 
With access to a civil remedy, trafficked women need not rely solely on criminal 
prosecution of their traffickers to see justice done. Prosecutorial discretion and 
resources thus are not the only factors determining if a trafficking case of some 
kind can be brought. Leveraging the lower standard of proof in civil litigation, civil 
remedy actions allow individual women to seek money damages from their 
traffickers directly, without concern for establishing the trafficking offense beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 186. See Projects: Stop Girl Trafficking, AM. HIMALAYAN FOUND., 
http://www.himalayan-foundation.org/live/project/stopgirltrafficking.  
 187. K. Subbarao & Laura Raney, Social Gains from Female Education: A Cross-
National Study, 44 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 105, 105 (1995) (documenting, over 
the period of 1970–85, that female secondary education has a very strong effect on fertility 
and mortality and that family planning reduces fertility more when combined with female 
education).  
 188. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 § 1595, Pub. L. No. 
108-193, 177 Stat. 2876.  
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More recently, the California Trafficking Victims’ Protection Act, passed in 
2005, offers legal protection for the individual choices of trafficked women.189 It 
too offers a civil remedy provision, and even more importantly, includes a human 
trafficking caseworker provision, which defines the relationships that trafficked 
individuals establish with their social-service caseworkers as privileged, much like 
attorney-client relationships.190 Previously, traffickers’ defense attorneys could, in 
their efforts to defend their clients, invade these relationships to access information 
about the trafficking; the fact that they could be subpoenaed made caseworkers 
uneasy about hearing full accounts of the trafficking, which reduced their 
effectiveness in assisting their clients because of a lack of complete knowledge 
about clients’ post-trafficking needs. Now, a privileged relationship means that 
trafficked persons can feel safe seeking assistance through candid 
communication.191 This provision operates to level, in part, the inequality that 
trafficked persons experience from any of a number of axes of oppression. By 
allowing women to seek assistance from those trained to offer information and 
counsel, caseworker privilege means that social-service providers can maximize an 
individual’s range of options and opportunity to express agency by equipping her to 
make informed, individualized decisions about her subsequent actions, once free 
from a trafficker’s control.  
Legal solutions such as caseworker privilege or civil remedy provisions in 
trafficking-related laws exemplify third-way intervention because they provide 
systematic solutions that enlarge the scope of a particular woman’s autonomy. 
They qualify as third-way interventions because they assist trafficked persons by 
leveraging society-wide legislative change to alter systematized oppression, but 
refuse to offer only unitary forms of intervention that universalize the experience of 
trafficking. Instead, a legislative grant of the right to seek civil remedies offers 
social change at a macro level while allowing women to assert their own rights 
against traffickers, reclaiming the profits of their forced labor for their own benefit. 
Caseworker privilege shifts the burdens and benefits of prosecution to support 
women as they seek counsel and make choices from a position of information 
rather than ignorance of the range of options available to them. In both cases, legal 
interventions offer social change, which enables individual women to agentically 
assert a self-defined vision of the good in their own lives.  
A more extreme, nonlegal form of intervention in dialogue with trafficked 
women is exorcism. Among Nigerian women trafficked to Italy, it is a common 
experience to be taken to the local practitioner of the animistic, indigenous religion 
by the trafficker prior to leaving a home village. There, the shaman casts a spell;192 
using blood, pubic hair, and underpants, a woman is bound to her trafficker by this 
curse, with various kinds of harm to follow for her or her family if she runs 
                                                                                                                 
 
 189. California Trafficking Victims Protection Act, ch. 240, A.B. 22 (2005). 
 190. Id. at sec. 2, 52.5(a). 
 191. This is an observation from my work advocating for the California Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act as a law student at Boalt Hall in the 2004–05 academic year.  
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away.193 From time to time, one Protestant minister who works with these women 
engages in a practice of exorcism in which he frees his clients from the spells they 
believe to oppress them.194 When asked to explain why he does this for the 
Nigerian women who are his clients, as this pastor does not himself believe 
exorcism to be occurring, his response is a profoundly third-way one: he does it 
because the women themselves believe the spell to be the source of their 
oppression. He intervenes with exorcism precisely because it subverts the 
systematized oppression that these women seek to overcome in order to be freed 
from their circumstances.  
Even this kind of nonlegal solution is third way because it balances recognition 
of social sources of oppression—here, culturally specific religious belief—with the 
lived oppression of an individual. This pastor does not exorcise each of his clients, 
but only those who identify the voodoo spell as an obstacle to leaving trafficked 
sex work. In this sense, he does not universalize the solution. Rather, in a third-way 
feminist manner, he identifies the systematized oppression and the particular source 
of the oppression in which he must intervene, acknowledges the intersection of this 
form of oppression with others, and ultimately offers individual women the choice 
of agentically requesting exorcism as a solution to their trafficking situations. 
While this is obviously not a legal intervention in trafficking, it does offer a 
valuable model of how those who do third-way work with trafficked women offer 
solutions rather than force them upon individuals. To offer a trafficked woman 
access to what she believes that she needs in order to get out of trafficking, without 
regard for one’s own personal beliefs in its efficacy, is to allow women space for 
agentic action.  
Notably, none of the interventions discussed here as third-way solutions to 
trafficking forcibly removes women from trafficking situations. Instead, they 
provide access to social resources that might shift the calculus that an individual 
trafficked woman performs in deciding whether to run away or seek assistance in 
leaving a life of trafficked sex work. These interventions demonstrate a profound 
comprehension of an oppressive social system, but look to identify a particular 
intervention point; they see women as individuals living under a system of 
oppression and present solutions as choices to individuals, rather than externally 
imposing intercessions. 
Although these are only initial visions of what third-way intervention in 
trafficking looks like, they differ dramatically from the “rescue” example discussed 
in the Introduction. Third-way intervention is dialogical and radical. It seeks to 
change society and to change the station of individual women through social 
reform. It respects individual women, but offers a powerful critique of the society 
in which specific women make their personal life decisions. Rather than 
                                                                                                                 
 
 193. KEVIN BALES, UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL SLAVERY 131 (2005) (documenting the 
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 194. This pastor was my supervisor during my time providing social services to Nigerian 
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themselves to be under supernatural control.  
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condemning individual women’s choices as unworthy of respect or demonstrative 
of false consciousness when those choices increase the possibility of personal harm 
and oppression to women, this third-way approach mandates constant questioning 
of the context in which individuals make decisions and ongoing effort to render that 
society more just and equitable, thereby increasing options for individual women. It 
cannot abstract the individual from her society; neither does it consider the society 
to the detriment of particular women. Third-way feminism seeks feminist change 
through a combination of social critique and individual action.  
IV. SYNERGIES BETWEEN THIRD-WAY FEMINIST INTERVENTIONS AND THE 
CAPABILITIES APPROACH TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
While this Article conceptualizes trafficked women through the lens of feminist 
legal theory and generates a set of interventions as the fruits of a feminist 
theoretical harmonization, third-way feminist theory on trafficking likewise finds 
generative force from another source. The development theory articulated by 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, known as the capabilities approach to human 
development, resonates strongly with the theory here articulated of the victimized 
and yet agentic trafficked woman as an intended beneficiary of development and 
human rights efforts. Although the capabilities approach found its earliest 
articulations as an economic model offered by Nobel Prize–winning economist 
Amartya Sen and a strain of Aristotelian thought from feminist philosopher Martha 
Nussbaum, the theory of the capabilities approach to human development has 
subsequently taken great hold in the arenas of public policy and political 
philosophy.195 
The capabilities approach to development is one particular application of the 
answer that Amartya Sen proposed to the question, “[e]quality of what?”196 Unlike 
many other forms of egalitarian moral reasoning that focus on strict equalities of 
outcome or opportunity as the basic definition of fairness, Sen’s take on the 
capabilities approach advocates equality of individual capabilities to achieve 
“functionings” as the crucial dimension of distributive justice.197 Under this 
conceptualization, a functioning is a part “of the state of a person—in particular the 
various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life.”198 Functionings 
might include nourishment, health, or even more complex notions such as self-
respect.199 Nussbaum presents the model slightly differently by focusing on 
concrete capabilities of “what people are actually able to do and to be,”200 expressly 
articulating a list of ten “central human functional capabilities”: “1) Life,” “2) 
Bodily Health,” “3) Bodily Integrity,” “4) Senses, Imagination, and Thought,” “5) 
Emotions,” “6) Practical Reason,” “7) Affiliation,” “8) Other Species,” “9) Play,” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 195. NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 11.  
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and “10) Control over One’s Environment.”201 In either case, the key is not the 
achievement of functionings, but rather the way that capabilities capacitate 
individuals to live a variety of different kinds of lives.202 Inherent in possessing 
such a set of capabilities is the freedom of an individual to envision and bring to 
fruition a particular kind of life of his or her own choosing.203  
Applying these basic notions to the development context, the capabilities 
approach centers around a fundamental notion that the goal of development efforts 
should be increasing individuals’ capacities to pursue life ends, which Sen 
describes as a set of freedoms.204 Poverty, according to the capabilities approach, is 
not merely the absence of goods or income, since goods are only derivative and 
income is a means of attaining capabilities.205 Rather, poverty under this conception 
is best understood as capability deprivation, under which individuals are 
constrained in their ability to pursue the kinds of lives they value.206  
Importantly, the capabilities approach does not mandate a particular set of life 
choices, a matter on which both Sen and Nussbaum agree. To both theorists of the 
capabilities approach, freedom to choose has intrinsic importance, since choosing is 
a part of living.207 The role of the state is not to control the outcome of the choices, 
but rather to equip individuals to make refined choices among functionings.208 To 
demonstrate this phenomenon of individual choice, Sen distinguishes fasting from 
starvation.209 While food insecurity is incompatible with the capabilities approach, 
an individual who has access to sufficient food for nutritive purposes might choose 
to fast for idiosyncratic reasons such as religious devotion or political principle. 
This distinction is illustrative of the agnosticism of the capabilities approach, since 
it permits individuals to pursue any ends of their own choice with the capabilities 
they possess, while simultaneously insisting on a social goal of equipping each 
individual with a set of capabilities above a threshold level.210  
                                                                                                                 
 
 201. Id. at 78–80. 
 202. Sen, supra note 197, at 33.  
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The relationship between the feminist rendition of trafficking offered here and 
the capabilities approach to development and human rights work more generally 
indicates the problems inherent in oversimplifying complex social phenomena that 
affect the least advantaged of the global society. The capabilities approach 
highlights how theorists and policy makers alike must properly comprehend the 
relationship between a woman and the experience of trafficking. The third-way 
feminist approach I offer provides a second framework for conceptualizing the 
situation of a trafficked woman because it demands that women have meaningful 
life choices. When trafficking represents a choice under circumstances of 
constrained autonomy where limited alternatives are available, the capabilities 
approach insists that the proper intervention is to increase individual capabilities. 
Whether the choice to be trafficked is, as Sen terms one possible negative array of 
options, one among a group that the individual might describe as “‘bad,’ ‘awful,’ 
and ‘gruesome,’”211 or is actually reflective of agentic action of choosing among 
viable options is essentially impossible for the outsider to know.  
What the outsider can do, however, is offer prophylactic and post-trafficking 
interventions that boost the capabilities of the individual woman who is either 
susceptible to trafficking or already trafficked, which are precisely the kinds of 
sociolegal interventions that third-way feminist theory offers as well.212 Crucially, 
both for this form of feminist thought and under the capabilities approach, the 
ultimate individual choice to perform sex work is outside the realm of the proper 
sites of intervention. Instead, it is by increasing the array of options available to a 
particular woman that her agency is furthered and her choice might approach a 
level of freedom consistent with her autonomy.213 The interventions that I propose 
here set forth a model for increasing individual women’s life options, whether as a 
prophylactic measure to prevent trafficking or as an intervention in trafficking 
situations to assist trafficked women in accessing other life choices. Whether 
microcredit, civil remedy, or caseworker privilege, all of these interventions build 
the social capital that an individual woman possesses, rejecting a hegemonic, 
universal solution in favor of possible interventions that contemplate the 
complexity of the factors that lead a woman into a trafficking situation and keep her 
there long term. These interventions are third-way feminist ones because they 
address the sources of gendered power imbalances, without imposing a unitary 
outcome on women, and they are consistent with the capabilities approach because 
they actually increase the possibilities available to individuals.  
Approaching the vignette with which this Article begins from the standpoint of 
the capabilities model, we land in a place of serious concern with the initial 
choosing moment in which an individual woman susceptible to trafficking assesses 
her options. The capabilities approach demands that women reach that moment 
with a full stock of social capital—educated, healthy from access to preventative 
medical care and proper sanitation, in a nation that respects individual civil and 
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political rights and that offers her viable employment options. The capabilities 
approach provides a proper degree of outrage when faced with women’s conditions 
in Burma that render them likely to migrate for sex work. Likewise, for women 
who have already found themselves in Thai brothels, the capabilities approach 
suggests that preferable interventions are agnostic ones that an individual can 
leverage in multiple ways to improve her living conditions. Whether framed 
through the third-way feminist model or the capabilities approach, a 
reconsideration of the opening vignette requires a posture towards a trafficked 
person that appreciates the individual as agentic and self-determining in the face of 
limitations, instead of ascribing a narrow status of victim or agent.  
CONCLUSION 
The promise of third-way feminism is not confined to the theoretical conflict 
around the trafficking of women for sexual purposes and migration for sex work. 
Feminist debates on other issues—pornography, pregnancy-related leave, sexual 
harassment—could be subjected to a similar process, as Abrams suggests.214 From 
a broader perspective, the general feminist dialogue on smaller, less controversial 
topics is even riper for the application of a method that embraces the strengths of 
polar positions. Furthermore, this kind of concretized analysis of the middle ground 
between dominance and liberal feminists engages in the developing conversation 
about the role of agency and constrained autonomy in the legal and philosophical 
literature. The intervention model suggested here offers one suggestion of a 
tangible application of this theoretical discussion.  
What this model proposes is the possibility of long-term collaboration between 
the two poles of feminism. Third-way feminism, applied concretely to issues of 
legal justice, suggests a growing demilitarized zone, where it may be possible for 
feminists who vehemently disagree about first principles to reach détente on the 
possibility of interventions for the purposes of increasing women’s agency under 
conditions of oppression. Furthermore, this model presents a response to the 
common and wrongheaded complaint regarding critical legal theory, including 
feminist theory—that it is destructive, seeking only to critique, rather than 
constructively offering positive interventions. This project leverages critical 
feminist insight to propose effective, targeted interventions that address real 
problems facing real women.  
Finally, the synergy between the conclusions that this kind of feminist legal 
theorizing generates and the principles and purposes of the human capabilities 
approach offers external validation of this project. At the nexus of liberal-political 
philosophy, contemporary economics theory, and pragmatic efforts of international 
development, the capabilities approach indicates how a focus on properly 
understanding the intended beneficiary of a program can lead to interventions that 
build room for the exercise of agency even under constraints. Using law and policy 
to build the capabilities of individuals and communities is a worthy justice goal in 
itself; that it reaffirms fundamental principles of feminist theory offers additional 
justification of both modes of thought and possibilities of future scholarship as well. 
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